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INTRODUCTION:          
This paper examines the inclusion of public interest evaluations in competition law, generally 
and further specifically as it regards Merger Analysis. Reference will be made to the 
Competition Act
1
 (the Act) and to case law- so as to graphically illustrate examples where 
public interest considerations have, or at least should, substantially influenced decisions made 
by competition authorities. The basis of this paper will be to examine whether public interest 
in the general sense
2
 will enhance consumer welfare, and in the specific sense
3
 whether its 
consideration enhances the stated economic goals of income and wealth distribution with the 
overarching goal of realising economic growth and development.  
Before a definition of competition law is given, there needs to be an understanding of 
how this particular law functions in tandem with the national competition policy that 
underlies it. ‘Competition Policy...lays out the parameters of the relationship between the 
state and economic citizens and between economic citizens themselves, in a manner 
somewhat akin to the way the constitution regulates the relationship between the state and the 
individual citizens and between individual citizens themselves.’4In developed countries, ‘The 
underlying purpose of antitrust policy is to prevent monopolisation, promote competition, and 
achieve allocative efficiency.’5The need for competition law to stem from this competition 
policy is further explained here to be as a result of the rapid expansion of markets, both 
domestically - as a result of globalisation and reduction in barriers to trade, and 
internationally as well
6
.   
‘National competition law can be defined as a set of rules and disciplines maintained 
by governments relating either to agreements between firms that restrict competition or to the 
abuse of a dominant position. A major objective of competition law in most jurisdictions is 
efficient resource allocation, and thereby the maximisation of national welfare, by ensuring 
that the competitive process is not distorted or impeded through the abuse of dominant 
                                                          
1
Act 89 of 1998, as amended. 
2
Regarding section 2 of the Act. 
3
Regarding section 12A(3) 
4
Competition Policy in South Africa, Where has it come from and where is it going?, The Investment Analysts 
society of Southern Africa, www.iassa.com (Accessed 10November 2011) 
5
C.R. McConnell and S. L. Brue, Economics: Principles, Problems and Policies (McGraw-Hill), International 
edition, 19
th
ed, at 598. 
6
Ibid  
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positions...or competition restricting agreements between competitors that are detrimental to 
social welfare.’7 
This definition, by the inclusion of “social welfare”, shows that there are 
considerations in the competition legislation of developing countries that include 
considerations not only of a purely efficiency driven nature
8
 – i.e.: public interest 
considerations, that form part of the machinery created to accomplish the mission to secure 
national welfare. These other considerations include the use of this specialized legislation by 
governments to attain national economic goals of growth, efficiency and social welfare.  This 
is where the realm of public interest employs itself, that is to say, to have regard to the other 
stated needs of society at times where a certain transactions or conduct is undertaken by a 
firm in the market. The effects that result are dictated, by public interest, to consider external 
factors that are affected directly by the transaction/conduct
9
. Therefore public interest 
considerations are a species of legal regulation of a market that are non-efficiency motivated. 
This regulation is mandated by the Legislature in South Africa as per policy created by the 
Executive
10
 and which is executed practically by the Judiciary
11
. 
 
The public interest factors are not applied in a vacuum
12
. They need to be applied 
regarding specific conduct or transactions. The consideration of these issues is a form of 
regulation of market function by Organs of State. The competition authorities do not 
investigate firms at random to see whether they are complying with these specific public 
interest standards. They are instead considered at times where conduct is reported and 
brought to the attention of the competition authorities, or in times where a merger is being 
evaluated. There exist other legislations that exist to address matters of which public interest 
relates to. Regarding matters that involve employment
13
 and black economic empowerment
14
 
legislation exists with more ‘teeth’ that governs these matters15.  
                                                          
7
Bernard Hoekman and Peter Holmes, Competition Policy, Developing Countries and the WTO, (Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd 1999), at page 875.  
8
As per the antitrust policy of developed states defined immediately above. 
9
See Merger section below. 
10The Minister of Trade and Industry. Herein referred to as “the Minister”. 
11Through the Competition Tribunal (herein referred to as “the Tribunal”) and the Competition Appeal Court. 
The Competition Commission is a body akin to the National Prosecuting Authority which forms part of the 
Executive.  
12
As case law evidences ad nauseum. 
13
The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998; Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act 75 of 1997. 
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Therefore the public interest tests will be engaged in times where either anti-
competitive conduct by a firm in the market occurred, and/or in times where transactions 
between firms (sizeable enough to fulfil a Ministerial determined threshold) can be 
reasonably assumed to impact on the market thereby warranting its investigation. Mergers 
fall within the genus of these transactions, as according to the cited definition of competition 
law above, competition restricting practices is the overarching family to which merger 
transactions belong. Public interest analysis regarding any investigation into such a 
transaction or to conduct that is deemed anti-competitive is undertaken after the ‘competition 
enquiry’16 has been completed by the relevant competition authority17. 
 
There exists a problem with these ‘non-efficiency goals’ from the outset as they 
encompass economic considerations linking macroeconomic principles of economic growth, 
to microeconomic ones of efficiency, social welfare and equity. This is a complex problem as 
in its application, the question arises of whether the Judiciary of a country is the medium that 
is best suited to address these matters. This argument will augment the consideration of 
whether public interest should be encompassed within the ambit of competition legislation.  
Some are of the opinion that public interest has no impact on competition
18
 whilst 
others vehemently adhere to the opinion that public interest indeed has a secured reservation 
to a place in competition legislation. In this paper I intend to prove my hypothesis that public 
interest (as a form of market regulation) does indeed have a warranted and deserved place in 
competition legislation, whose existence is further required because of the historical and 
restrictive nature of political/governmental regulation of national economies of past regimes.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
14
Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003, that seeks to increase opportunities for 
previously disadvantaged South Africans to participate in the national economy. Herein after referred to as “the 
BEE Act”.  
15
This application of other legislation regarding matters to which public interest is linked, is to be understood in 
terms of the rationale for the creation of these legislations. See Merger Section below for a discussion on policy 
rationales for these legislative enactments. 
16
Regarding matters of efficiency (which is always the subject of the first enquiry) and/or the suspected breach 
thereof, an investigation into whether the conduct offends this efficiency  criteria by examining whether the 
conduct and its effects substantially lessens or prevents competition, as encoded in Section 2(a) and (b). 
Regarding mergers, the same analysis is undertaken, as encoded in Section 12A(1) and (2) of the Act.  
17
This procedure has not always been adhered to, as was the case in MediCross HealthCare Group (Pty) Ltd 
/Prime Cure Holdings (Pty) Ltd (11/LM/Mar05) [2005] ZACT 66. 
18
Tracy Hancock, Public Interest Consideration Best Left to Other Agencies? Merger and Acquisitions. 
PUBLISHED 02-04-2010.  
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In terms of these opinions, with specific reference to mergers, I view it in a different 
light. There are copious amounts of legal texts which state ad nauseum that public interest is 
not a criteria that has ever been practically used to disallow a merger that has in fact been 
discovered to be pro-competitive, or vice versa. In terms of this contention, I fully concur as 
it is evident there has never been a case which was decided solely on public interest grounds. 
The Judiciary has relied on findings that the public interest matters are not ‘substantial’ 
enough to offset the anti-competitive effects, even though there has been no definition in the 
Act of what exactly is to be regarded as such. However I do not believe that this is the area in 
which public interest is in reality employed.  
The non-efficiency goals of the Act are to promote social and consumer welfare, in a 
manner that regards equity as a factor
19
. It is further deemed to be a regard that is had, in a 
manner that is conducted separately from the regard given to efficiency considerations. 
Therefore as a starting point, prohibited mergers will not be discussed, as they have been 
prohibited on the grounds they were found to be anti-competitive, and as stated have to date 
never been saved by public interest considerations. Upon examining the approved mergers, it 
will be seen that the approvals were subject to conditions
20
. It is in these conditions that the 
public interest and the goals stated in the Preamble of the Act are given a forum to be 
addressed and where they are realised. It is through these conditions, made with respect to a 
balancing act between the needs of the merged entity and the needs of the affected 
areas/people, that economic development, economic growth, and income and wealth 
distribution are furthered. 
To surmise, there are three main questions addressed in this paper, namely: 
(1) Whether there is any merit in the argument for free markets and against governmental 
regulation or whether the diametrically converse argument is to be preferred;  
(2) Should the need for regulation exist, then to what degree is this market regulation 
desirable and practically conducted? Evidence of the practical degree of its application 
will be evidenced by the case law that will be discussed hereunder
21
; 
                                                          
19
The manner in which this is conducted in terms of the economic policies that are applicable, will be discussed 
below. 
20
Which I regard as being a regulation of the behavior of the players that exist within the market, and therefore 
of the market itself. 
21
Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd 66/LM/Oct01; Mittal Steel et al v Harmony Gold 
Mining Company et al 70/CAC/Apr07; and Wall-Mart Stores Inc and Massmart Holding Limited 
73/LM/Nov10. 
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(3) Finally, regarding Merger transactions, should public interest be a sufficiently convincing 
criteria to contribute to a decision regarding whether the transaction will be prohibited, or 
conditionally/ unconditionally allowed? Furthermore, how these conditions are 
implemented, and how their importance is understood in terms of economic rationale that 
guides them. 
CHAPTER ONE– Understanding Competition Policy   
In order to enforce the social welfare goals, that are the rationale behind the creation of public 
interest policy, competition law is the selected mechanism for addressing such matters. 
Competition law is the machine employed so that the State can guide the market to work in a 
certain fashion, namely: The realisation of traditional goals of competition whilst 
simultaneously encouraging the market to function as freely and as openly as possible, 
according to a more beneficial and socially responsible standard. This machinery was 
selected as it is the one with the thinnest barrier between the Organs of State and the actual 
market, as it further provides for specialised forums where these two forces are able to 
interact. In these forums the government has the ability to regulate the markets structure and 
its activities, to a certain degree. The degree and need of such regulation will be understood 
via a comparison between two diametrically extreme forms of market systems, discussed 
hereunder. 
The Preamble: 
Competition legislation is South Africa is to be interpreted first and foremost in accordance 
with its Preamble, whose ideologies are to underlie the understanding of the provisions of the 
sections that follow it. The Preamble which makes reference to economic discriminatory 
practice that was perpetrated by the past regime on racial policy that permeated the political 
core of Apartheid South Africa.  
 
Effectively, there were two separate economies in existence during Apartheid
22
. The 
economic players, able to navigate and exploit the totality of the national economy, were the 
minority group of the State who had at their disposal the most opportunities and capital to 
grow and to benefit as its exclusive participants. The majority of the nation’s citizens were 
not afforded access to such interaction and the effects of this legally sanctioned blockade are 
                                                          
22
Hartzenberg T, Competition Policy and Enterprise Development: The Role of Public Interest Objectives in 
South Africa’s Competition Policy, (August 2004), at 6.  
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still being felt today. This segregation of a distinct and substantial sect of the population 
relegated them to the lower echelons of society where they were kept at a lower standard of 
living with no prospects of escaping and substantially hindering their economic development 
and growth albeit their desire to participate existed. 
 
The wording of the Preamble was carefully selected to include descriptive and 
emotionally charged words such as ‘unjust’, to convey the severely immoral basis on which 
the Apartheid economic policy was enacted and surgically implemented, so as to depict to the 
reader the gravity of the degree of change that is now required in order to ameliorate these 
past ‘injustices’. Within it, there is a call for effective administrative bodies to ensure the 
continued existence of this ‘new’ competition policy which in its mandate includes the 
promotion of enhanced mobility and access to all markets by all South Africans without 
political reservations. The call is for consideration to be had to the rights and needs of all 
participants in the market at all levels, with the ultimate goal of securing positive economic 
growth and consumer welfare increases by strategically encouraging greater product choice 
and international commercial interaction. It is from this template of interpretation that the Act 
will be read therefore giving the reader an understanding of the magnitude of importance that 
the public interest provisions are to be afforded.  
 
The goals of the Act, are listed in Section 2, which state that the purpose of the Act “...is 
to promote and maintain competition in the Republic in order – 
(a) To promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy; 
(b) To provide consumers with competitive process and product choices; 
(c) To promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South 
Africans; 
(d) To expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets and 
recognise the role of foreign competition in the Republic; 
(e) To ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the economy; and 
(f) To promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership 
stakes of historically disadvantaged persons....”23 
                                                          
23
I have not included the following sub-provisions of section 2 as they are not related to the argument being 
made in this paper. 
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Sub-sections (a) and (b) include the main goals of any competition law throughout the 
world
24
, whilst sub-sections (c) to (f) list the additional equity and distributive objectives 
which are a continuation of the spirit of the Preamble. More specifically, they were 
incorporated into the Act as defined goals in an attempt to prevent the effects of these 
injustices from surviving into South Africa’s democratic era and thereafter hindering the 
progress that was and is desperately needed
25
.  
These public interest provisions are considered with regard to the effects that specific 
conduct or transactions occurring within the market would have, and are given attention (after 
the competition efficiency considerations have been addressed) in the form of a balancing 
test
26
. The public interest enquiry is to be conducted separate from the efficiency enquiry
27
. 
 
Equity concerns are further incorporated into the Preamble and the need for this will be 
elucidated with reference to the needs of developing countries.  
 
The public interest provisions that are listed in section 2 of the Act will be discussed in 
relation to the needs of developing countries in chapter 3, so as to give substance to the 
argument for their existence. Regarding the discussion on mergers refer to chapter 4. 
CHAPTER TWO– Economics: Market Models     
There exist various market models, each with their own proponents and critics. Against the 
inclusion of public interest s ctions in Antitrust Legislation, reference will be made to 
proponents of the free market system, which postulate that the core nature of the market is 
                                                          
24
These goals form the primary evaluation in any competition matter. Should the conduct that is being 
investigated be a merger, an abuse of dominance, cartel behaviour etc, be contrary to the promotion of 
efficiency and who offend against the competitive process through any disruption at all.  
25
This is therefore an indication that the Act has some politically charged rationale behind its creation, in that 
equity and justice as driving forces have been incorporated into the interpretation and therefore intended 
application of this legislation.  
26
Specifically regarding a merger evaluation, a determination will need to first be made as to whether the merger 
will ‘substantially prevent or lessen competition’. Thereafter there will be an investigation based on the 
representation of the merging parties as well as other investigations by the Competition Commission that will 
evaluate whether there are any ‘technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains’ that will result as a 
direct consequence of the merger. This forms the competition efficiency enquiry into the specific merger 
transaction. The final part of the balancing test is to see whether the public interest provisions of the Act (in 
s12A(3)) are affected. Ideally this final analysis should be conducted regardless of the outcome of the efficiency 
analysis, and the result of this public interest enquiry should be regarded in the determination of the outcome of 
the decision to allow or refuse the transaction- in theory at least. 
27
M Brassey (ed), Competition Law, (Lansdowne: Juta, 2002), at 275. Albeit this applies to consideration of 
public interest in merger analysis, the same rationale applies to public interest considerations in the general 
sense as well. 
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self regulatory and as a result it will thus adjust itself and reach an equilibrium point befitting 
the markets needs at that time. This is said to occur as a pure consequence that free 
competition (and all that this entails) has on the market. Conversely, there exist arguments 
that in a market setting prevalent- specifically- in most developing countries, the preferred 
market policy regime is to be a planned market structure, or a command economy. The 
rationale that the protagonists of this ideology rely on is that there are other, closely linked, 
tangential national needs that are to be addressed through this form of legislation that is the 
one which is most closely suited to addressing such matters.  
 
(I) Free-price mechanism: 
(a) The basic economics of a free market system: 
‘A free price system or free price mechanism ... is an economic system where prices are set 
by the interchange of supply and demand, with the resulting prices being understood 
as signals that are communicated between producers and consumers which serve to guide the 
production and distribution of resources.’28‘The private ownership of resources and the use of 
markets and price to co-ordinate and direct economic activity characterize the market 
system…each participant acts in his or her own self-interest…(and) seeks to maximise its 
satisfaction or profit through its own decisions regarding consumption or production…’29. 
‘Basic to the faith that a free economy best promotes the public weal, is that goods 
must stand the cold test of competition; that the public acting through market’s impersonal 
judgement, shall allocate the Nation’s resources and thus direct the course its economic 
development will take.’30 Of course the national market forces will define and develop the 
economy, bringing with it growth and prosperity to various industries, and this force is said to 
be solely governed by the decisions of consumers, as evidenced by these ‘signals’. The 
extreme application of free market systems would lead to pure capitalism
31
. 
Some are of the opinion that ‘Since prosperity and decent employment are promoted 
by, and only by, real economic freedom in free market economies...’32, that there is zero need 
                                                          
28
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_price_system 
29
McConnell and Brue, op. cit. note 5, at 33.  
30
Times-Picayune Publishing Co v United States, 345 US 594 (1953) at 605. 
31
 McConnell and Brue, op. cit. note 5, at 33. 
32
Leon Louw, Economic Freedom Defined, 
http://freemarketfoundation.com/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleType=Publication&ArticleID=1746 
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for market regulation
33
. That regardless of the surrounding circumstances that are present in 
any given nation, at any given time, market forces will prevail and settle the market at an 
equilibrium that is beneficial, and will put the growth of the economy onto the path that will 
result in the closest attainment of Pareto Equilibrium
34
. This school of thought believes that 
any state ‘…interference will disturb the efficient working of the market system.’35 
The basic market model used herein focuses on Supply by Producers and Demand by 
Consumers. The supply will be affected solely by the amount of demand that there is for a 
good in the market, as there is no rationale to supply a good that has zero demand.  
However the demand of a good will be determined by looking at factors of the good 
provided in that market. The main determining factor for the demand of the good will always 
be its price, in tandem with the utility that the good can provide. Further considerations 
would be the substitutability of the good which is closely linked with the price elasticity (or 
price inelasticity as the case may be) of demand function for that good. In a free market 
system, the factors that are considered are ‘pure’ and therefore free from any consideration 
regarding governmental regulation. Again, such regulation would include public interest 
considerations. 
A graphical representation of the relationship between demand and supply in a 
market, as well as a representation of the demand curve will be provided to better understand 
the market forces at play in a free market economy. 
 
                                                          
33
This is laissez-faire capitalism. 
34
Rachel Jafta & Johann van Eeden, The Economics of Competition Policy, Paper for the Free Market 
Foundation Competition Policy Round Table, (Econex) 30 June 2011, at 7, with reference to Reekie, W.D. 
(1999). The Competition Act, 1998: An Economic Perspective. South African Journal of Economics, 67(2): 
257-288 
35
McConnell and Brue, op. cit. note 5, at 33. 
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The Pareto Optimum position that is desired to be reached is where the cost of producing a 
good is equal to the cost of the revenue received for the good. It is the point in a market 
where by the increase of one unit of production by one party thus increasing their position in 
the market, the corollary effect will not be that another party in the market is consequently 
worse off as compared to their situation before this additional unit was produced/consumed. 
‘Pareto efficiency is a minimal notion of efficiency and does not necessarily result in a 
socially desirable distribution of resources: it makes no statement about equality, or the 
overall well-being of a society.’36 
                                                          
36
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_optimum 
The intersection of the curves indicates the point 
where the demand of a good by consumers equals 
the supply provided by producers, and is a 
representation of the point when the market is in a 
general equilibrium. This is a crucial point because it 
affects the relationship between the goods/services 
that a consumer demands with, in this case price, the 
opportunity cost the consumer is willing to sacrifice 
to gain the utility from obtaining the product. 
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Economically speaking, competition law aims to maintain the market at this 
equilibrium thereby preventing unit prices increasing and unit output
37
 decreasing, in an 
attempt to allow for the market to attain Pareto Optimality whilst at the same time being 
aware of the fact that the conditions for the market will never exist for this to occur. 
On the demand graph above, at price A the supplier is a price taker, which therefore 
means that the market is more sensitive to the needs of consumers. This therefore will be the 
Pareto Optimal price as the degree of harm that could be inflicted on a consumer at this point 
is negligible. 
 
‘...an economic market is determined in order to identify an equilibrium price....’38 
Should there be a Shortage then the Seller would increase prices and demand would decrease 
accordingly until a new equilibrium would be reached. However this new equilibrium would 
be further away from the Pareto Optimum, as there are still demands in the market for the 
good however due to the characteristics of the good (specifically its higher price) the 
consumers do not regard the opportunity cost of paying over the amount demanded by the 
Seller, as being equitable to the unchanging utility derived from consumption of that good. In 
a few words, the definition of Pareto Optimality is not fulfilled because while the seller is 
better off at charging this higher price and reducing output, consumers gain an ill-related cost 
to consumption utility from the opportunity cost they sacrifice in purchasing the good. What 
would solve this dilemma would be where the supplier either increases the supply of the 
good, or in terms of competition, where more producers would enter that market thereby 
increasing the price elasticity of demand in that market as a result of an increase in the 
substitutability of the goods and thus driving prices in the market down whilst at the same 
time increasing output. Therefore in a sense the public interest ground of Section 2(e) is a 
Regulation designed to aid market conditions to exist that mirror the requirements of a free 
market economy, in an attempt to attain perfect competition.  
 
The Demand Curve graph will depict where the Pareto Optimum level of production 
will be for a market, assuming that it is a free market. The conditions for a free market are 
largely the same for when a market will be considered perfectly competitive.  
                                                          
37
Quantitatively and qualitatively 
38
Trends in South African Competition Law, Webber Wentzel Attorneys, (14 June 2004), 
http://www.webberwentzel.com/wwb/content/en/page1874?oid=3111&sn=Detail&pid=1874 
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‘A market economy will be perfectly competitive if the following conditions hold: 
(i) Sellers and buyers are so numerous that no-ones actions can have a perceptible 
impact on the market place, and there is no collusion amongst buyers and sellers 
(ii) Consumers register their subjective preferences among various goods and services 
through the market transactions at fully known prices. (In addition it is a 
homogenous product) 
(iii) All relevant prices are known to each producer, who also knows all input 
combinations technically capable of producing any specific combination of 
outputs and who makes input-output decisions solely to maximise profits 
(iv) Every product has equal access to all input markets and there are no artificial 
barriers to the production of any product.’39 
(aa) The law as understood in terms of the free market system: 
The Chicago Jurisprudential School states that efficiency is the only consideration that is to 
be had in the market. No other considerations are to be had when deciding to regulate the 
market. They are of the opinion that “...the law becomes less effective the more its true 
purpose is mixed up with other objectives.”40 
The argument of: ‘Why “competition and its regulation”? Why not view competition...as 
the antithesis of regulation and celebrate it for that reason, as the triumph of market forces 
over administrative intervention.’41 The reason for regulation, albeit skeletal regulations in 
terms of this schools’ contentions, is that the requirements for a perfect market simply do not 
exist.  
(i) In the real world, dominant firms exist in the market42 whose actions are definitely 
felt in the market. The amount of Sellers and Buyers in the market is affected by 
historical and other extenuating factors.  
(ii) Products are not homogenous. In markets, there may be a general function of a 
good. However due to innovation there are characteristics that will make a good 
within this narrow market segment stand out from the rest. For arguments sake 
let’s use the example of a market for plastic bottles. They may be made of thick 
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Dominance of a firm will exist in a stand alone fashion should the firm have sufficient market power by itself, 
however it can also result in the same effect should collusion between sellers occur. The extreme case of this 
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plastic for rugged use, or thin plastic for those that are environmentally friendly. 
They may have screw tops, or nozzles that are mechanically controlled or pressure 
controlled. The possibilities are endless.  
(iii) There is never symmetrical information in a market between all the producers and 
on the part of the consumer. 
(iv) The barriers to entry for the access of a product to a market are inter-related to the 
issue of the number and specifically the size of certain firms in a market.  
 
In terms of the Act, this would be in fulfilment of Section 2(a) and (b), which are purely 
focused on efficiency considerations and considerations that would provide the consumer 
with greater choices (i.e.: For there to be increased suppliers in the market as explained 
above). This form of ‘regulation’ is not contrary to the contentions of the Chicago School 
because it exists to aid the process of free markets, only when such assistance is needed. 
‘Although a free-trade stance...greatly reduces the scope for anti-competitive practices to be 
sustainable, it does not imply that the need for competition law disappears.’43 Competition 
law here is restricted to ensuring that firms do not act in a manner that would substantially 
prevent or lessen competition. 
 
It is then from this economic construction that the relevant authorities are able to 
investigate whether there exist excess profits, thereby providing a basal point that can be 
compared against to see whether a firm with market power behaving in an exclusionary and 
anti-competitive manner, and thereby acting in a manner that is not efficient. I am not talking 
here about State authorities acting as price setters in a market as this would be a drastic 
regulation completely at odds with the principles of a free market economy, but rather that 
this is a factor that could aid them to determine whether there has been a perpetration of 
exclusionary conduct or whether post transaction there would be too great a concentration of 
market power in a single entity that would avail that entity of opportunities to act in a 
competitively reprehensible manner. In a word, it allows State to ensure the efficiency of the 
market, acting in accordance with natural market function alone.  
 
The implications that are brought due to the fact that the market will never be perfect, is 
that government is tasked with creating laws that will attempt to reduce the disparity between 
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a Pareto Optimality and the actual reality of the market. This would be done by legislation 
that includes the requirements for a competitive market to be codified, and then somehow 
enforced. However this is obviously impossible.  
 
The market forces of demand and supply discussed above function in terms of collecting 
and interpreting the market signals. Where there is a high price it would indicate that there is 
a shortage of supply and a surplus of demand. In terms of competition, this would attract new 
firms to that market sector in as it is appealing due to the high demand that exists in that 
market, all other factors equal
44
. Should more firms be introduced to this market
45
 that would 
mean that the proportionate share of the market held by the already existing firms will 
decrease accordingly – and therefore the dominance of certain firms would be mitigated, 
consumers would have a greater choice of like products, product innovation would be 
encouraged in attempts to differentiate between competitors – thus increasing the quality of 
products provided, excess profits held by the already existing firms will decrease, etc. Once 
equilibrium between demand and supply is reached
46
 then there would be no more profit 
incentive for the firm to continue to increase supply
47. At this point, the consumer’s needs 
and wants are able to be satisfied and the opportunity cost of obtaining this product and the 
linked utility that the consumption of this product would bring is reasonable and viable for 
the consumer to undertake. However these numerous and non-exhaustive benefits are only 
able to be realised should the market be perfect, and this understanding is related more to the 
genus of essential facilities as compared to its relation to general tradable products.   
On the other hand, ‘...as resources become more scarce the price increases, which signals 
to consumers to reduce consumption thereby ensuring that the quantity demanded does not 
exceed the quantity supplied. It is in this way that the free price system persuades consumers 
to ration dwindling resources.’48 This highlights the self regulating abilities of the market.   
The matter of public interest is not addressed in this market system. I believe however, 
that the inherent failure of this market model is that it fails to take into account extenuating 
circumstances that are present in the market and that cannot be assumed away when using 
such models based on the pretence of a perfect market. This pretence does not include 
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considerations of historical discrimination and the effect that it has in terms of cementing 
possible market players in the most disadvantageous position.  
(b) Planned Economies: 
The idea of this method of thinking is that ‘Constraints are necessary before freedom can be 
achieved’49.  
‘A planned economy is "an economic system in which the government controls and 
regulates production, distribution, prices, etc."’50 
The reason for State intervention in the form of market regulation has numerous 
rationales. “The justification for central planning is that the consolidation of economic 
resources can allow for the economy to take advantage of more perfect information when 
making decisions regarding investment and production.”51 
A rationale for regulation comes from the fact that the modus operandi of firms includes 
primary aspirations to further their own interests- in the form of profits- within the market 
exclusive of any considerations that would impede the realisation of these goals. This is the 
ideal situation of a firm, to provide their product at cost price plus a profit percentage and to 
maximise their return. The reason for regulation is to reduce such actions that are contrary to 
the interests of the market, as the effects of exclusionary and anti-competitive conduct is 
borne by society, with the qualification to do so in a manner that would satisfy all parties.  
These are considerations that Governments need to address because the protection of 
society is one of their primary tasks. It is under this guise that governments defend their 
stance on the adoption of this economic policy. However, the guise of beneficial outcomes is 
simply a mirage. It is a fleeting illusion conjured by the promises of leaders of a future 
Utopia, but one which has no overall intention to be allowed to materialise, at least not for 
society at large
52
. This is particularly true for emerging markets/developing countries that are 
stricken with issues of poverty, cronyism, and corruption
53
.  
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On the matter of state owned monopolies - i.e.: Communism
54
 – which is the extreme 
form of state regulation of markets, ‘There is...widespread recognition that where, as a result 
of government policy, market forces do not operate and where regulation is ineffective, the 
services that we receive are expensive and inefficient.’55 Should a State move from a 
communistic policy to a capitalistic one, extreme caution must be taken so as to allow for the 
transition to traumatise the market to the smallest degree. In situations where governments 
have reduced market regulation post recognition of the detrimental effects regulation has, 
they realised ‘…that what the retreating states left was a vacuum…that was not filled by a 
benign invisible hand pointing in the direction of efficient outcomes, but one that was rather 
filled by private concentrations of economic power, if anything less able and willing to 
promote economic efficiency and consumer welfare…(which resulted in) an environment that 
was not only extremely hard for those obliged to live and work in it, but one that was 
extremely unattractive to investors and, so at odds with the basic requirements for dynamic 
competition and economic growth.’56 
Every firm exists to further its own position in the market. A firm that abuses its position 
in a way that increases barriers to entry is in line with the firm’s aspirations to further itself 
and realise a maximum return, as with fewer competitors comes a greater percentage of 
market share and a greater incentive to increase a price charged beyond the acceptable level. 
This occurs as a result of substitutability and price elasticity of demand functions having been 
reduced. Regardless of the actions of the firm the harmful effect is again shouldered on 
society and on the consumer. Therefore regulation is important to increase the permeability 
and mobility of the market, according to both schools of economic thought promoting either 
free markets or regulated ones, state that consumers and the economy will always benefit 
with more competition in the market. Public interest as a regulation addresses this issue 
specifically in Section 2(c) and (e) of the Act.  
In the past South African competition regime, ‘Practically, once the (Competition)Board 
had made a ruling to the effect that an acquisition was not in the public interest, the Minister 
did not override that finding and would proceed to prohibit the merger.’57 
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It has been seen that both the free and the planned market models have their pros and 
cons. However neither is suitable in its entirety to be implemented into the economy of a 
developing country in a ‘plug and play’ fashion, especially not in the South African economy. 
The drafters of competition policy in South Africa realised that ‘…markets led o economic 
outcomes superior to those attainable through administrative direction of the economy; but 
(also) that in order to realise their considerable promise, markets had to be subject to effective 
regulation.’58  
CHAPTER THREE – The Needs of a Developing Country  
The situation of the economic growth of developing countries is a sensitive and elastic one. 
South Africa’s history is distinctive in the sense that the discrimination that existed within the 
nation was not only sanctioned, but legally enforced by the government. When the country 
was liberated from the claws of institutionalised racist policy, it was deemed necessary to 
implement other policies to counteract the (specifically) economic discriminatory policy, 
whose purpose was to promote and enforce economic disparity and limit opportunities for 
market participation by an identifiable market segment. Even though the method of 
implementation of such discrimination was unique, the effects produced are not uncommon 
in other countries. ‘High levels of concentration are common...Markets are small, consumers 
are not well informed of their rights, and capacity to effectively implement competition 
policy and law is scarce. Challenges of unemployment...as well as a history of excessive 
government regulation and adverse effects on competition are also common to many 
developing countries.’59 
 
 In a developing country, consumer’s income is statistically lower than in developed 
countries
60
. As a result there is a decreased amount of national saving and increased 
expenditures- expenditures made with little available resources to begin with. There are 
broadly two types of goods in an economy: 
(i) Consumption goods, which are purchased and used by consumers to satisfy their 
needs. Should there be any surplus in earnings post consumption of these goods, 
there is generally an increase in savings and investment.  
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(ii) With this capital, capital goods are bought that are then used in the increased or 
more efficient production and supply of further goods
61
. This increase also brings 
with it more employment opportunities.  
 
The cycle grows and grows with every increase in investment and as a consequence, 
simplistically, economic growth and development is promoted. This vital cycle is however 
premised upon the requirement that there are sufficient citizens earning monies above levels 
that satisfy their needs in terms of consumer goods, and therefore there is a sufficient level of 
savings pooling from which to invest and continue the cycle through to its next progression 
of capital goods purchases. ‘Economic growth is positive when investment exceeds the 
amount necessary to replace depreciated capital, thereby allowing the next periods cycle to 
recur on a larger scale.’62  
 At the end of the day it is the consumer who through their actions and economic 
decisions, further the economy and stimulate growth
63
. The Act was created to include 
provisions that would protect the consumer from certain kinds of harm
64
 that amount to either 
an abuse of dominance by a firm that holds sufficient market power, or by exclusionary 
conduct. The effect of these conducts is that there would be an unnecessarily and 
unjustifiably increase in expenses incurred by the consumer, whose expense is inflicted on 
the consumers income thereby reducing savings equivalently. Should this regulation of such 
conduct of producers in the market not exist, then the result would be that firm (that for 
argument sake has market power and therefore whose conduct is able to have an appreciable 
effect on the market) would be in a position to abuse it to the detriment of the consumer. 
Without regulation there would further be no forum to address and prevent this oppressive 
behaviour, market dominance would be a high probability
65
 which would then result in 
barriers to entry being high and market forces subsequently being sand-bagged out and 
prevented from engaging. Pareto optimality would never be realised, and the result would be 
that social welfare would be injured if not destroyed. Should the product that the hypothetical 
firm in question produce hold a price inelastic characteristic, the consumer will then need to 
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spend more on these goods. As a result there will be less expenditure in other industries, 
which translates into economic growth effectively being severely retarded and as a conjoined 
consequence social welfare and economic efficiency will be unattainable. This is however an 
extreme view, which would only exist – if ever – in the short term. Nonetheless the example 
is useful to explain the far-reaching and damaging effects that are associated with lack of 
regulation regarding the conduct of firms.  
 
Therefore the market will need to be regulated in a manner that has more goals in 
mind as compared to a free market economy so as to prevent harm to the consumer and 
further to society as a whole. There is clearly a need for regulation, as a developing country is 
in a position that has its origin on the back foot as it were. Such regulation however needs to 
exist at a point where ‘…the optimal amount of regulation is that at which the marginal 
benefit and marginal cost (of said regulation) are equal….The task is deciding on the right 
amount.’66 
Factors affecting economic growth and development, and whose rationale formed part of the 
basis for its inclusion in public interest provisions enshrined in section 2 and 12A(3) of the 
Act, include matters relating to the equity and fairness. ‘We cannot speak of development 
without a serious consideration of the problem of inequality.’67  
Regulations in terms of mergers and the rules that state the transaction needs to be 
investigated upon surpassing stated thresholds is a form of preventative and forward looking 
market protection mechanism.  
The argument against a free market system is found inherently in its characteristics 
that due to signals being sent by consumers and producers in the market, the allocation of 
resources will be generated in a manner that would have the overall effect of directing the 
growth path of the economy. In a developing country that has scarce resources a free market 
will not accurately direct the most beneficial economic growth path. Many economists that 
agree with free market systems argue that through efficiency, equity will eventually be 
reached. The problem is exactly that. Equity will be reached as theory dictates, however the 
time that it will materialise may be far too long. It is not plausible for a new democratic 
government, that has recently prevailed over a past oppressive system (be it Apartheid or any 
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other oppressive past regime, with which numerous developing countries are riddled), to at 
that point indicate to the population that efficiency will be the main driving factor in their 
new economic policy and that equity shall be disregarded due to complications in its 
application. According to Kuznets inverted U model, what will initially result through a 
purely efficiency driven economic policy will be a deterioration in the economic standing of 
the poorest and a bolstering of such standing of the richest. Even though this will be 
temporary and income distribution will begin to rise once per capita levels increase beyond a 
certain point, this is not an argument that the population with such a history will accept. Civil 
unrest is almost certain to result which would collapse the economy even further.  This 
contention would be an argument in favour of market regulation specifically in the form of 
public interest. 
However, where there is a situation of an over concentration of regulation, where 
states have reduced their interference in a previously controlled market by “...withdrawing 
from the economy...they quickly discovered that what the retreating states left behind was a 
vacuum...filled  by private concentrations of economic power, if anything less able and 
willing to promote economic efficiency and consumer welfare....”68 This is then a testament 
to the fact that a decrease in governmental regulation of the previously heavily regulated 
market needs to be done in a fragile balance, (that is, not to interfere too much and not to 
leave it completely free) because the common result would be resultant inefficiencies and 
harm to socio-economic interest of the consumer. 
Therefore there cannot be a complete assimilation of either market system into an 
economy because the immediate effects would be harmful, and the inherent characteristic of 
dominant firms in the market would be to incubate their practices in an attempt to ensure 
continued benefits flowing to them.  
On a discussion regarding the origins of competition policy, national law reflects and 
addresses goals that are peculiar to that nation, “...but what they had in common was that they 
all responded to a growing recognition, first, that markets led to economic outcomes superior 
to those attainable through administrative direction of the economy; but, second that, in order 
to realise their considerable promise, markets had to be subject to effective regulation.”69 
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Governmental market regulation in developing countries that is enshrined in its 
competition law policies should be aimed to increase mobility and access to the market whilst 
simultaneously making strides to attaining the overarching and broader goal of national 
economic growth and development with the idea to enhance social welfare
70
.  
Regulation is required in terms of varying degrees. Regarding essential facilities, 
“...the demand here is for stronger, more effective regulation rather than further deregulation. 
There is, in other words, widespread recognition that where, as a result of government policy, 
market forces do not operate and where regulation is ineffective, the services that we receive 
are expensive and inefficient.”71 
 
I view the Apartheid policies as being to a degree akin to a State monopoly as it were. 
This is seen in light of the segregation of the economic market. Whites were allowed to 
participate freely and to the exclusion of all other segregated pe ple. Therefore when the 
markets opened and this ‘state regulation’ fell away, I believe that should the market have 
been made free and open as it was, yet further left to fend for itself and auto-correct as the 
proponents of Free market systems believe
72
, the result may have been too similar for 
comfort to the resultant vacuum relating to privatization of markets as discussed above.  
  
There are different types of market participation of course. South Africa was seen to 
have two different domestic markets during Apartheid which merged with democracy. 
Previously disadvantage people were now able to freely act as producers and consumers, 
however they were confronted with a difficult hurdle to overcome when it came to market 
participation in a role of a producer or competitor. The only means to ameliorate this 
predicament is through regulation. Regulation that is not focused on efficiency alone, but also 
to have regard to what has been termed ‘public interest’ so as to allow for the market to be 
permeated by all members of society with some market players being afforded a degree of 
heightened protection, ideally for a limited period- whose duration is not currently 
determinable. This raises questions of who will decide when this period has ended or whether 
it will end in stagnated steps or decisively on the fulfilment of criteria that are also to be 
decided without certainty. This matter will not be addressed, as the current fact is that some 
form of regulation in South Africa’s economy is required. 
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The reason for the inclusion of the public interest grounds listed in the Preamble of 
the Act as well as in sections 2(c) and (f), as well as in 12A(3)(b) and (c), is to empower 
courts to aid the market in functioning in a manner that results are as near to Pareto Optimal 
as possible.  
 
The problem that the economic free market model fails to take heed of is the fact that 
in a country where there has been rampant yet calculated discrimination against a sector of 
the consumers in a market, there cannot be reliance on market forces to self regulate after a 
political change in climate has occurred. I feel that a free market system would be efficient 
should all the ‘players’ in the market start on equal footing. Not equal in the sense that they 
have exactly the same resources available to them or that they have the exact same 
opportunities, but rather that on average these factors are at least similar. 
 
With the history South Africa has, the position of the white minority was 
advantageously secured through the actions of the Apartheid government. It is not rationale 
or possible to believe that post 1994, previously disadvantaged people could, as a result of 
now being freely able to equally participate in the economy inclusive of all the benefits that 
such participation entails, be able to begin to participate at a competitive level. The resources 
that they have are no-where near those of the previously advantaged members of the market, 
neither is their knowledge, expertise, or accessibility to and mobility in said market. 
As a result of these factors, regulation is not only desired it is inherently required. 
There can be no other medium to attain a satisfactory equilibrium where the constitutional 
principle of equality is realised. There is an argument that in time the regulation is to 
diminish accordingly so as not to allow for a situation where benefits of market regulation are 
unduly imposed in a manner that would accord an unfair advantage, and thereby defeating the 
principle purpose of the regulation.  
However this is a matter that will need to be decided in the future, and in order to get 
to the place in which a decision is capable of consideration, policy previously created by 
government must reach a certain stage of fruition – particularly in the spheres of realising 
certain levels of the economic goals of development, efficiency and social welfare. “Policy 
statements related to economic efficiency and consumer benefits provide for flexibility in 
interpretation. References to adaptability and development of the economy, extend beyond an 
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interpretation of economic efficiency in a static welfare state, to incorporation of dynamic 
considerations including market entry, firm mobility and innovation.”73 
A form of regulation which has occurred recently is the enactment of the Consumer 
Protection Act
74
 which will allow consumers to bring complaints against firms in a market for 
conduct that is not in line with its provisions. This has the effect of giving more power to the 
consumer to help State Agencies like the Competition Commission to investigate 
questionable conduct. This has the effect of increasing the scope and ability of government to 
regulate the dealings of firms so that it will ensure that this Section 2 will be better addressed. 
Exemptions to the applicability of the Act are enshrined in section 10 of the Act. 
These apply should the stated requirements be satisfied. These exemptions provide the 
necessary wiggle room for courts to apply the law in matters that are not clearly black and 
white, which ties into the degree of regulation of the market that needs to be imposed. “A 
particular reason for consideration of an exemption application is ‘ensuring economic 
stability’.”75 
Dave Lewis ‘...argues that the high levels of poverty and inequality need to be addressed 
urgently and this requires that all the country’s policies be directed towards addressing these 
problems...’76 . He further states that ‘…in a country like South Africa, while we, the 
Competition Authorities, may well understand the pitfalls in balancing competition and the 
public interest, we equally recognize that a competition statute that simply ignored the impact 
of its decisions on employment or on securing greater spread of black ownership, would 
consign the act and the authorities to the scrap heap.’77 In an attempt to understand how 
Organs of State envisage the furtherance of these non-efficiency goals, development 
economics is a useful tool.  ‘Ultimately, economic inequality is the fundamental disparity that 
permits one individual certain material choices, while denying another individual those very 
same choices.’78 
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 In terms of any of the public interest provisions that are designated to regard matters 
of employment and securing greater spreads of black ownership generally
79
, or specifically
80
 
so as to understand the effects that a change in market structure would have, regard is to be 
had to income distribution economics. It is useful in that it provides theories that can be 
transposed to understand how an economy is performing at any moment in time with regard 
to its strive to attain minimal levels of disparity across classes and overall, to highlight areas 
that require attention so as to attain satisfactory economic growth and development. Income 
distribution has been defined as a measure of ‘...how a nation’s total GDP is distributed 
amongst its population...(and it) has always been a central concern of economic theory and 
economic policy... (Furthermore its) Important theoretical and policy concerns include the 
relationship between income inequality and economic growth.’81 The arguments made were 
based on the use of per capita income values in varying countries and the rationale for its 
usage is based on particular studies that ‘…express the idea that per capita income is a 
powerful correlate of development, no matter how broadly we conceive it.’82 ‘Saving rates 
are severely affected at low levels of income; so is the capacity to do useful work.’83 
 
A survey indicated that ‘...the poorest 40% of the population earn on average, around 
15% - perhaps less – of overall income, whereas the richest 20% earn around half the total 
income.’84 Furthermore, ‘savings rates are severely affected at low levels of income; so is the 
capacity to do useful work.’85 As a result of this decrease in savings, comes further harm in 
that poverty, malnutrition and education all take a savage beating. In order to give some 
useful understanding to the concept and the results that inequality brings, information about 
‘(a) how endowments were distributed and (b) what kind of economic interaction occurred in 
the “previous period”…’86 must be available. ‘…the goal is to see how a given past 
influences the future…’87 ‘It is common place to see enormous wealth coexisting with great 
poverty…It isn’t that such inequalities do not exist in the developed world –they do- but 
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coupled with the low average income in developing countries, these disparities result in an 
outcome of visible poverty and destitution
88’ 
 
Regarding the graph depicting Kuznets hypothesis
89, it ‘…indicates the possibility that as 
economic growth proceeds, it initially benefits the richest groups in society more than 
proportionately… At higher levels of per capita income, economic gains tend to be 
distributed more evenly.’90 Using the Tunnel Theory91 with regard to the progress of 
economic development, poses a grim prospect of acceptance. Seeing as the richer segments 
of society benefit first and inequality will rise, post Apartheid this would mean that the 
suppressed members of the population will be exposed to further inequality and that they will 
observe previously advantaged people benefit further. The only way that this dissatisfaction 
can be bearable is when the hypothetical individual’s levels of tolerance are high as he is of 
the expectation that soon he will also benefit. However, ‘…increased inequality may not be 
tolerated at all if the perceived link between the growing fortunes of others and the 
individual’s own welfare is weak or non-existent. The greater the extent of segregation to 
begin with, the higher the possibility of this outcome.’92  
 
‘If growth and equity in income distribution are considered to be the two principal 
objectives of the process of economic development, the development strategy has to be 
devised by keeping in mind the social and political context.’93 
 
 There are of course other factors that contribute to the development and growth of a 
nation, which are factors termed human development. Matters such as the education policy of 
a government, life expectancy and infant mortality rates. In a country like South Africa there 
is not a good education system with poor literacy levels. Thereafter there is the issue of aids 
that plagues this country – whose incidence is increasing and which has a direct effect on life 
expectancy rate . This severely hampers the growth and development that is attainable by the 
State. Education has been deemed to be the best tool available to combat this plague. 
However per capita income is still closely correlated to these other factors, even though 
                                                          
88
 Ibid, at 18. 
89
 Ibid at 198. 
90
Ibid at 25. 
91
Ibid at 200. 
92
Ibid at 201. 
93
Ibid. 
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‘…per capita income, or even the equality of its distribution, does not serve a unilateral 
guarantee of success in ‘human development’…(however) per capita GDP still acts as a fairly 
good proxy for most aspects of development…’94 
 ‘Recent literature in economics has emphasized the fact that investment in education 
and training that raises the skills embodied in labour is no less an investment. Skills may not 
be tangible objects like machinery, but they contribute to increased production just as any 
piece of machinery does. The act of training and education may be aptly termed investment in 
human capital.’95 This then forms the rationale upon which most conditions regarding 
mergers, as they affect employment, are premised.  
 In terms of the ability that a South African firms have to become internationally 
competitive, one needs to have regard to what the comparative advantage is of this 
developing country. ‘It is clear that, on the whole, developing countries do rely on primary 
product exports, whereas the opposite is true for the developed countries.’ 96 This however is 
dangerous as such goods are traded in a highly fluctuating market and so there is not a 
method to foresee changes in levels of demand. This would lead to wasting of economic 
products
97
. 
 
There needs to be some sort of regulation of the emerging markets. This is abundantly 
clear. However what is also as clear is that public interest concerns needs to be incorporated 
into such regulation. Should the market be left alone to self regulate, the chance exists that 
the previously disadvantaged will remain as such and that the rich will continue to benefit 
from the position they once enjoyed as a result of their previously advantageous economic 
situatedness
98
. Each country has specific and unique national interests that are peculiar to 
them. Accordingly, the national interest as codified in legislation will reflect steps taken in 
meeting these objectives. “Major challenges to sustainable development in South Africa are 
employment and black economic empowerment. Explicit reference to these factors is thus to 
                                                          
94
 Debraj Ray op. cit. note 60, at 29. 
95
 Ibid, at 53. 
96
 Ibid, at 39. 
97
 Some goods can be stored and their sale effectively postponed till such time where demand for them once 
again exists. However some goods are of the inherent nature that they need to be sold soon after their 
production. These goods will therefore pose a problem of wasting, an example of which is in the agricultural 
industry where products may be perishable. If the agricultural industry is a core export industry in this 
hypothetical state, then demand for the goods (or lack thereof) severely affects the ability for that state to attain 
any measure of economic growth. 
98
In South Africa such a position was, as a result of Apartheid protection, enjoyed by the white minority. 
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be expected in a significant area of policy and law such as competition and in some sense 
provides a balance of considerations in the challenge to develop a set of complimentary 
policies and laws to facilitate enterprise development and the achievement of broader socio-
economic objectives.”99 Their achievement is aimed to be fulfilled by the public interest 
criteria in the Act. 
CHAPTER FOUR– Mergers & the Public Interest      
OVERVIEW 
In terms of both anti-competitive conduct
100
 and mergers
101
, the two key factors that are 
considered before any investigation is initiated are: what is the defined market
102
; and then 
whether the firm has market power
103
 in said market.  This is classically the point of 
departure in any merger evaluation. However it is to be noted that this applies to the 
efficiency tests – the ‘competition’ analysis- and that in the consideration of public interest 
tests, the scope of same is much broader
104
. Public interest is a machine of political and 
economic origin, which is engaged in the niche of law that has access to powers of regulation 
over market activity – to some degree or another. 
Mergers, sometimes referred to in terms of the genus of business activity termed 
concentrations, occur in one of two ways. Either two or more companies join all assets and 
liabilities between them respectively
105
 to form a new entity, or where one company (the 
target company) is incorporated into another company (the acquiring company). ‘Whilst a 
firm may build market power through unilateral conduct, the easiest way for a firm to 
establish or to enhance market power is by acquiring or merging with other firms.’106 Market 
power and efficiencies are therefore the main incentives that drive firms to consider merging. 
 
                                                          
99
Hartzenberg, op. cit. note 22, at 17. 
100
That involves section 7 abuse of dominance matters. 
101
Regarding section 12 and 12A matters. 
102
If the market is defined too widely then the effect of the merger on said market will be diminished, whilst if 
the market is defined too narrowly then the effect will be unrealistically magnified. 
103
Should the firm not have market power then their actions are negligible as market forces of price elasticity of 
demand and substitutability will be engaged to auto-correct the consequences of this conduct.   
104However there are instances where ‘competition’ considerations and public interest ones overlap. Lawrence 
Reyburn: Philip Sutherland and Katharine Kemp Competition Law of South Africa, (LexisNexus Butterworths 
Durban) Service Issue 14 (October 2011) at 10-5. 
105
Wholly or partially. 
106
Brassey, op. cit note 27, at 224. 
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The importance of mergers is to be analysed in terms of the consequences they bring
107
. 
‘There must be a causal link between the merger and the anti-competitive effects on a 
market.’108In the end, the anti-competitive effects of a merger are evidenced in terms of 
efficiency considerations, and again – public interest is a broader consideration than the 
efficiency segment of the evaluation. Regardless, the same rationale holds true for the 
consideration of the public interest probes in a merger evaluation – namely, the effects that 
substantially affect the public interest need to have a connection to the transaction being 
evaluated. The courts have repeatedly in their ‘...previous decisions indicated that (they) do 
not exercise (their) public interest determinations in a void.’109 
 
There exist three classes of mergers, namely horizontal
110
; vertical
111
; and conglomerate, 
‘...which in that order, attract decreasing levels of concern.’112 Furthermore these classes are 
subdivided into large, medium and small mergers – which in South Africa are classed as such 
in terms of parameters established by the Minister of Trade and Industry. Horizontal mergers 
are said to be the form of mergers that attract most attention and therefore scrutiny.   
 
The subdivisions of the classes of merger being large, medium or small exist for a reason. 
Upon surpassing the stated thresholds
113
, the merging parties will need to follow the 
                                                          
107‘Merger law focuses less on anti-competitive conduct and more on the structure of the market....(with) the aim 
to prevent anti-competitive results’ Sutherland & Kemp op. cit. note 104, at 8-7.  
108
Sutherland & Kemp op. cit. note 104, at 10-8. With reference to Santam Ltd/Guardian National Insurance Co 
Ltd 14/LM/Feb00, and a few other cited cases listed in footnote 57.   
109
Distillers (South Africa) Ltd v Bulmer (SA) (Pty) Ltd 2002 (2) SA 346 (CAC), para 232: With reference to 
Unilever Plc and other/Robertson’s Foods (Pty) Ltd and others 55/LM/Sep01 para 43; and Shell/Tepco Supra 
note 21, para 58. 
110Involve firms ‘...selling identical or similar products in the same geographic area thereby eliminating 
competition between the two firms... (and) result in the elimination of competition between competing firms.... 
Brassey, op. cit note 27, at 225. (Word inserted) Horizontal mergers, due to the fact that they occur within the 
same market segment, they have the potential to deliver efficiencies and innovation in that market that would 
tremendously benefit the consumer. With this benefit, the roll on effect is that the other competitors in the 
market will have to evolve technologically and therefore innovate their products/services in their attempts to 
remain competitive. This further benefits the consumer as the result, ideally, would be that the products on the 
market increase in range and quality to suit whatever need the consumer may harbour at that time.  
111
Their most common justification that the firm (integrating forward or backwards) is doing so primarily to 
fulfil ‘...its desire to minimise transaction costs and cure principal-agent problems.’ Dr. Roger Van der Burgh & 
Dr. Peter D. Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: Chapter 9- Eileen Reed Concentrations 
and Merger Control, at 350.  
112
Brassey, op. cit note 27, at 225. Vertical mergers are said to be ones that occur in the same supply chain and 
are usually undertaken for efficiency rationales so that the acquiring firm can streamline its business activities 
and reduce costs. Conglomerate mergers are described to be mergers of firms that operate in different markets 
that seemingly have no connection to the competition that exists in either of the markets. 
113
As discussed in s11 of the Act. 
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procedural steps of the Act and notify the Commission of their intention to merge
114
. This 
notification
115
 procedure has been created so as to firstly aid the Competition Authorities to 
remain involved and informed of activities of firms within markets they are tasked to 
safeguard (as it is impossible to constantly monitor every firms activities within the national 
territory) and further to aid the Competition Authorities to qualitatively focus their attention 
on transactions with the greatest impact. Seeing as the Commission is a government agency it 
has limited resources and therefore cannot afford to investigate every single matter. These 
thresholds apply to both efficiency tests as well as to public interest ones, as they are 
designed to indicate the degree to which importance is to be attributed to them in terms of 
their ability to noticeably affect the markets function and its structure.  
 
Mergers have as their economic consequence a ‘structural change’116 within the defined 
market as there is a decrease in competition within that market segment due to one of the 
firm’s from that market essentially disappearing. ‘A concentration implies that firms integrate 
their operations more completely and permanently than was the case under a contractual 
setting....’117This fact highlights the gravity of this form of transaction. A merger cannot be 
undone at a later stage via judicial interference, as is the case with a cartel for example. On an 
examination of the economic effects that would occur should a firm exit the market for any 
other reason besides merging with another competitor, it will be evidenced that market forces 
will engage themselves and the market will find a new equilibrium following the loss of one 
of its producers. The loss of a producer in a market, besides the competition concerns
118
, will 
have effects that will be felt on the different links of the supply chain involved in that market 
as well as on interrelated industries, society, and the nation’s productivity as depicted 
internationally.  
 
                                                          
114
As discussed in s13 – with regard to small mergers; and s13A - with regard to intermediate and large mergers; 
of the Act.  
115
As per the parameters set out in Section 13 of the Act, read together with GN 254 and GG22025 of 2 
February 2001. 
116
E. Reed op. cit. note 102, at 349 
117
Ibid. The comparison of the effects of a merger are further extended to one between mergers and cartels. The 
inherent difference between cartels and mergers is that due to the core characteristic nature of cartels, they are 
self destructive as they are based on the trust of parties that are by virtue of this association, dishonest. 
118
The market share that was held by that firm will be distributed, albeit potentially unequally, amongst the 
remainder of the competitors within that market on the basis of the other firms by virtue of existing in the same 
market producing substitute goods. However, when a firm merges (specifically horizontally), all of its market 
share (and market power) is absorbed into the new merged entity, which then has the consequential effect that 
the merged entity increases its market share and power singularly, to the exclusion of all the other firms within 
the same supply chain link. 
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Note however that ‘...merger law “Is not, or not only, about pre-emptively preventing a 
merged entity from abusing its dominant position in the future; it is also about maintaining a 
market structure that is capable of delivering the benefits that follow from 
competition.”’119However the effects of the merger in terms of public interest are more far 
reaching than merely loss of a player in that industry. s12A(1)(a)(ii) states the importance of 
public interest considerations- namely, that after the efficiency enquiry has been completed 
there needs to be further enquiry into the effects born from the merger that will follow.  
 
Should the efficiency test fail it is stated that a merger can still be allowed if it is able to 
be ‘…justified on substantial public interest grounds.’120 It was held121 that there is a 
possibility that the public interest grounds can within themselves also produce opposing 
views, and as a result the ‘…net public interest effect of a merger must be determined….A 
procedure for dealing with such situations has been developed (where either): Every public 
interest ground asserted must be viewed in isolation to determine whether it is substantial; 
(or) If more than one contradictory public interest ground is found to be substantial, then the 
competition authority must attempt to reconcile them; (or) If no reconciliation is possible, 
then the conflicting aspects must be balanced and a net conclusion must be reached.’122 It is 
against this backdrop of positive gains that a merger can bring (or of course the corollary 
negative harms) that public interest tests need to be employed in a comparative manner.  
 
The analysis of these transactions has as a unique characteristic the fact that it is carried 
out before the transaction or the effects thereof actually occur
123. ‘Based on the information 
and the data available prior to a concentration, competition authorities need to project its 
impact on a given market structure, which will only become fully established after the 
transaction has been implemented.’124 The events that will occur as a factual cause to the 
merger therefore need to be considered and ascertained using reasonable foresight based on 
economic and empirical evidence
125. ‘Antitrust authorities must predict the future by looking 
                                                          
119
Distillers/Bulmer Supra note 109, at 358, referred to Sutherland & Kemp op. cit. note 104, at 8-8. 
120
S12A(1)(a)(ii) and s12A(1)(b) of the Act. 
121
Harmony Gold Mining Co/Gold Fields Ltd 93/LM/Nov04, and Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd/Stellenbosch 
Farmers Winery Group Ltd 08/LM/Feb02 at par 214-217. 
122
Sutherland & Kemp op. cit. note 104, at 10-93 and 10-94 respectively, as confirmed in Supra note 121, Para 
219.  
123
Medicross/Prime Cure Holdings Supra note 17, at 62ff. 
124
E. Reed op. cit. note 102, at 349 
125
Some jurisdictions utilise economic formulae to ascertain the effects that mergers would have on the 
competition within that market. One of these formulae is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index.  
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
35 
 
at the past and current situations in a market. Research and economic tools are useful for 
making these predictions, but they never create absolute certainty and adequate data 
sometimes will not be available.’126 The evaluation of this form of common business activity, 
I view to be a regulation of the market by Organs of State. Whether I feel it to be a necessary 
regulation, will be illuminated to the reader below after consideration of the reasons for 
aforementioned regulation.  
 
Mergers form an integral part of everyday economic activity. As a result of this they 
cannot be classed and dealt with as a per se prohibition that are listed in section 4(1)(b) of the 
Act. This is regardless of the fact that the effects of the merger may well be such for which 
this per se prohibition was designed to protect against. It was for this reason that mergers are 
no longer regarded as a per se prohibition in the antitrust legislation of the United States of 
America, whereas in the past this species of transaction was in fact forbidden
127
. Mergers are 
transactions that can, broadly, either have as a sine-qua-non of their conclusion: a beneficial 
result due to the efficiencies they produce; or a detrimental result due to the harm they cause. 
It is for the existence of these efficiencies that a merger cannot be a per se prohibition as 
benefits to society would be foregone should mergers be disallowed outright. In the old 
antitrust legislation of the United States of America, the prohibition of this form of 
transaction was too heavy a regulation of the market’s activities. This was an example of 
regulation devised to protect the goals of the antitrust legislation however in application the 
reality was that it worked against the attainment of these goals. Whenever there are decisions 
being made by people who are not aware of the intentions, but moreover the effects of certain 
conduct, the consequence can rarely be desirable. 
 
Section 12A(3) of the Act lists the public interest criteria that are to be regarded in times 
of the evaluations and the disputes regarding such transactions. It reads as follows: 
                                                          
126
Sutherland & Kemp op. cit. note 104, at 10-6. This shows that the forward looking analysis of the 
consequences of a merger is not an exact science, and therefore this form of regulation is in essence an educated 
guess on what the result of the merger will be. With such guesses, there is an inherent flaw that the predictions 
are incorrect and therefore the decision to allow or prohibit the merger could then also be the incorrect decision. 
This is not a consequence that can be reversed and therefore the decision on the matter is considered cautiously. 
As was stated in Medicross/Prime Cure Holdings Supra note 17, ‘…the competition authority must still justify 
its findings on the facts before it.’  
127
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sherman_Antitrust_Act. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
36 
 
‘When determining whether a merger can or cannot be justified on public interest grounds, 
the Competition Commission or the Competition tribunal must consider the effect that the 
merger will have on- 
(a) A particular industrial sector or region; 
(b) Employment; 
(c) The ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; and 
(d) The ability of national industries to compete in international markets.’ 
 
Each of these factors will be analysed in depth below, referring to economic rationale 
behind the inclusion of these specific public interest criteria, and to case law in order to see 
how the Judiciary has had regard to the application of these criteria.  
 
There is a need to disclose all information by the merging parties to the competition 
authorities so that a specific determination can be made. Further the competition authorities 
sometimes require additional assistance and there are provisions or the Minister to intervene 
in merger matters and make representations to the court. Generally speaking should the 
competition authorities have minimal information asymmetry regarding the relevant aspects 
of the merger, they would therefore be in a position to rule more fairly and speculate less
128
. 
Reluctance to be forthcoming with all relevant information is however the norm, as by 
withholding certain information from the courts could have the possibility to secure future 
untold profits. The safeguard to this however lies in criminal regarding matters of perjury and 
fraud, with delictual matters relying on the doctrine of estoppel should for example an 
affected party suffer harm due to some or other aspect of the transaction. The point is that this 
is a dynamic field of law with effects of such transactions being far reaching and touch on a 
multitude of issues which have forums to address any issues that arise. With full disclosure, 
the amount of conditions placed on the entity, which are deemed to be a form of regulation of 
the markets, would be more accurately representative of the needs of society that the 
judgement of the Judiciary will affect, and therefore aid government to attain a degree of 
regulation that is not too little, not too much, but is just right.  
 
                                                          
128
 Mondi Ltd and Kohler Cores and Tubes/Competition Tribunal [2003] 1 CPLR 25 (CAC) 33. 
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(a) A Particular Industrial Sector or Region: 
First and foremost, there needs to be an examination of the wording of the subsection. ‘The 
term “industrial sector” should be interpreted widely to include any sector of economic 
activity.’129 This therefore highlights the recognition that a concentration transaction has far 
reaching effects
130
 that are not isolated to the specific market
131
 in which the merging firms 
operate.  
 
To understand the effects that a merger will have on a sector of the market there 
obviously needs to be an investigation done on the structure of that market niche and the 
environment in which it exists. The market determination methods used to indicate market 
power of a firm that are used in South Africa include analysis’ that use Concentration Ratios 
and the Herfindahl-Hirshmann Index, that are based on the structure of the market in relation 
to the number of competitors that function within that market
132
. However, the public interest 
factor in s12A(3)(a) refers to having a broader regard to the effects of the merger on an 
industry and/or region, and does not specifically deal with the market within which the firms 
exist because the efficiency test covers this determination sufficiently. 
 
In Iscor Ltd/Saldanha Steel (Pty) Ltd
133
, it was held that should the merger be prohibited 
the resultant adverse public interest effects would be egregious
134
. Saldanha Steel was a firm 
that was notoriously in financial difficulty as a result of global market fluctuations and 
conditions which were further compounded by domestic trade policy alterations
135
. The fact 
that the firm provided the fiscal injection required to stimulate economic growth and 
development in the region placed the Tribunals consideration of the merger in a precarious 
position
136.  ‘There is evidence that the Saldanha Steel plant is a vital part of the town’s 
economic life. If the plant was to be shut down…for a period this would not only have a 
substantial impact on the employees of the plant who would be retrenched, but also on all the 
                                                          
129
Sutherland & Kemp op. cit. note 104, at 10-95. 
130Specifically where the transaction is incidental to other industrial sectors and region’s. 
131
Which is understood to be at any point in the supply chain of the same industry. 
132
Sutherland & Kemp op. cit. note 104, at 10-17.  
133
67/LM/Dec01 at par 143-147. 
134
As was the case in Tiger Brands Ltd/Langberg Foods International Ashton Canning Co (Pty) Ltd, 
46/LM/May05 at Para 142, where it was evidenced that ‘…Ashton is heavily dependent on the canning firms 
since it is an economically troubled area that offers little hope for unskilled labour.’ The unskilled labour came 
mainly from seasonal workers that were employed by the thousands in the area for this industry. The merger 
would affect employment which would therefore affect the surrounding region. 
135Ibid, Para’s 17-35. 
136
Ibid, Para 144.  
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firms and individuals in the West coast region whose livelihoods are so dependent on the 
plants functioning.’137 This then indicates that this public interest criteria has regard for firms 
that exist not within the same supply chain. Saldanha Bay is situated within a the deepest and 
sheltered South African bay in the Western Cape
138
 and is therefore perfect for a port to be 
operational there safe from the dangers of open waters. The local economy is strongly 
dependant on the steel industry and the harbour
139
, and the development of the region into the 
modern harbour that it is today was as a result of the steel industry and the necessity to export 
steel from Sishen in the Northern Cape
140
. One of the biggest industries in South Africa is the 
production of steel from iron ore, which is connected directly to Saldanha by the Sishen-
Saldanha Railway Line
141
. As a result, Iscor built a railway line to Saldanha where it set up a 
production plant to refine the ore into a final product that could be sold domestically or 
exported and as a result of the geographic situation of the plant
142
, transportation costs are 
reduced and more jobs were created. This therefore stimulated the economy in the region 
from the production plant, the port, the transportation industry, and the shipping industry and 
all the intermediaries that it entails, to name but a few. Should this merger not have been 
approved the local economy may well have collapsed and the area may well have been 
reduced to idle capital. This would not only have impacts on the local economy but further on 
the steel industry as transportation costs would have increased to deliver the goods to other 
areas for exportation. This increase in production costs would have a negative impact on the 
ability of this vital South African industry to remain internationally competitive. 
In Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd/Gold Fields Ltd
143
, the merger was to take place in a 
sector of industry upon which the South African economy relies heavily, that is to say the 
gold mining sector. It was alleged by an economic expert witness
144
 that the merged entity 
would fail as a result of the poor management that the acquiring firm has suffered and that the 
risk posed to the economy was therefore ‘systematic’ and great. However this was held to be 
an extreme and improbable result that was consequently disagreed with. The opinion of the 
Tribunal was that should the merger occur then the ‘stronger’ target company could actually 
have a beneficial effect on the ‘weaker’ acquiring company and this would therefore help 
                                                          
137
Ibid, Para 145. 
138
http://ports.co.za/saldanha-bay.php 
139
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saldanha_Bay 
140
http://ports.co.za/saldanha-bay.php 
141
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sishen-Saldanha_Railway_Line 
142
Which is the areas comparative advantage.  
143
08/LM/Feb02 
144Ibid, at para 63, whose ‘expertise’ was in Para 74-75 rejected by the Tribunal. 
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attain a positive public interest result
145
.  This was therefore in effect an argument in favour 
of the merger as opposed to against it. In addition, should the merged entity fail as alleged 
probable by this expert, it was stated by the Tribunal that the assets would be sold off in 
liquidation proceedings as is the case in normal business activity, and bought up at a 
discounted rate which would then in all probability be used in the same industry and the 
economy in this market segment would continue to function
146
. It was held that there are 
market forces, in the form of stakeholders and interested parties of an entity, which would 
engage themselves to not idly stand by whilst the firm is ‘driven into the ground’147. This 
therefore shows that the public interest tests cannot be used, as the target firm desired, to 
circumvent the natural and positive application of market forces in an attempt to attain a 
preferred judicial and binding decision. Public interest is by definition a regulation of the 
market for the overarching non-efficiency goals that are stated to possess the force of law. 
However this is not an instance of a command economy where organs of state dictate in 
which manner a market will function based on its own, unjustifiable, opinion.  
In Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd/Transvaal Suiker Bpk
148
, there was a proposed merger in 
the sugar production industry. This industry is said to be extremely volatile as it is a residual 
market that is heavily regulated due to the fact that world prices are customarily below the 
average production cost of the sugar, as incurred in the producing countries
149
. It was held in 
terms of the public interest analysis that the merger would not have a substantial pro-
competitive or pro-public interest impact on the industry. The firm
150
 that was wanting to 
merge into the acquiring firm
151
 averred that its exit from the market would provide for the 
creation of smaller firms because THS states that it intends to sell 8000Hectres of land. This 
intended sale of the land is stated as being directed specifically to previously disadvantage 
individuals, and so would aid in the economic development of the regions concerned and 
their respective local communities as well
152. ‘However these benefits are not sufficiently 
substantial to countervail the negative impact of the merger on competition, nor is it at all 
clear that they will not occur in the absence of the merger… the merger will have no impact, 
one way or another, on the ability of South African firms to play a positive role in the 
                                                          
145
Ibid, at para 71. 
146
Ibid, at para 64. 
147
Ibid, at para 73. 
148
83/LM/Jul00 par 39-41. 
149
Tongaat-Hulett/Transvaal Suiker Supra note 148,  para 18. 
150
The firm cited TSB 
151
the firm cited THS 
152
Mpumalanga. 
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region.’153 
 In Nasionle Pers Ltd/Education Investment Corporation Ltd
154
, the proposed merger was to 
occur in the education industry that is held to be a core industry that is profoundly important 
and linked to the development of the nation. The Tribunal held ‘…we are bound to accord the 
education sector a stature reserved for few others….there is no question that the impact of 
monopolistic practices in the private education sector will reverberate more powerfully on the 
economy and society than would similar practices in most other sectors.’155Conditions were 
imposed onto the merging parties to protect this industry. Of the conditions that relate to this 
subsection is that a divestment of an identifiable segment of the merged entity occur, so as to 
stabilize the existence of competition within this important market and prevent possible 
abuses
156
. Furthermore the new company will be required for a period of two years to aid the 
Department of Education in discovering and aiding in the implementation of schemes to 
improve capacity in public education
157
. 
 In the large merger in Wal-Mart Stores Inc/Massmart Holdings Limited
158
, one of the 
conditions that were imposed was ‘the merged entity must establish a program aimed 
exclusively at the development of local South African suppliers, including SMEs, funded in a 
fixed amount of R100 million to be contributed by the merged entity and expended within 
three (3) years from the effective date of this order. This program will be administered by the 
merged entity, advised by a committee established by it and on which representatives of trade 
unions, business including SMMEs, and the government will be invited to serve. The merged 
entity must report back to the Competition Commission annually, within one month of the 
anniversary of the effective date, about its progress. In addition the merged entity must 
establish a training programme to train local South African suppliers on how to do business 
with the merged entity and with Wal-Mart.’159 
 This condition is an indication of how the Tribunal considered the possible effects that the 
merger would have on the industrial sector and region. It is an attempt to blunt the trauma 
that would be felt from the merger, having regard in its assessment of the known past 
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practices of Wal-Mart, namely that it is a corporate giant with international sourcing 
connections that are second to none. The ability that Wal-Mart has to procure products from 
abroad was a cause for concern that was raised at both the Tribunal and the Appeal hearings. 
It is an illustration of the fact that efficiencies brought through a merger as a result of 
procurement of goods of a certain quality and at a lower price are attractive as it boosts 
consumer welfare in terms of choice available and at a price cheaper than normal. However it 
is further an illustration that there are problems with such efficiencies that are in conflict with 
other needs of a state, namely the protection of the local economy and the local industry. To 
blunt the effects that this merger would have on local suppliers, the condition incorporates a 
fiscal investment in the region which is to be used in a manner that improves the industry and 
allows capital for a degree of innovation so as to remain competitive. Furthermore there is a 
sub-condition that suppliers are to be afforded training from Wal-Mart so as to be capable of 
trading with the entity. Consumers are to benefit from such transactions in their capacity as 
such, therefore increasing their utility per unit of consumption and further with a wider range 
of choices so as to maximize said utility in the consumption being in line with their individual 
preferences. However, looking at the bigger picture for a moment, local producers would 
suffer as their product would essentially be exposed to international competition, where 
perhaps other States have better comparative advantage in producing those items. There are 
however other safeguards in place that exist to protect the possibility that goods are imported 
at unfair prices
160
.  
(b) Employment: 
The basis for the inclusion of this is the same for the rationale used to include this public 
interest goal in section 2(e) of the Act. Namely, to ameliorate wealth and income distribution 
throughout the nation.  
 
Unemployment rates are of serious concern to government as they have a direct link to 
the productive efficiency of a nation, as labour is one of the nation’s most key resources161. 
Unemployment has numerous consequences, of which a strong link has been established 
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empirically to connect this status to an increase in the levels of crime and vagrancy
162
. Crime 
and vagrancy affect the economy negatively and is a massive problem in South Africa. 
Economic growth and development is severely stunted by these activities and is therefore 
prevented from growing at a positively steady pace. As a result, employment levels are of 
concern to government and should therefore be incubated from forces that could possibly 
affect its levels negatively. Currently the reported unemployment levels in South Africa is 
quoted at 25%
163
, while some of the poorer regions of the country report higher levels of 
unemployment
164. ‘With unemployment or productive inefficiency, the economy would 
produce less…’165. 
 
South Africa has a very large unskilled labour force. Employment allows for a forum in 
which skills are able to be learned and for these skills to be applied. Employment offers the 
channel through which households are able to have the tools to improve their standard of 
living and through which further educational opportunities could be availed to the next 
generation so that their subsequent lives will be improved. This is of course in the scenario 
where income is utilised in this manner. Labour is an important factor of production, and the 
skills held by the labour force are an indication as to what the potential ceiling of economic 
growth is at any given moment. With more skilled labour, productive efficiency rises. 
However ‘With unemployment or productive inefficiency, the economy would produce 
less…’166. Therefore levels of employment are to be fiercely protected and unemployment 
levels are to be combated and constrained from growing. However in terms of this public 
interest criteria, ‘In many cases, the problem of job losses can be addressed by imposing 
conditions.’167 
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The public interest in merger evaluation regarding employees, is centred mainly on 
procedural rights ‘…allowing employees to receive timeous information about mergers that 
often affect them deeply.’168 However there is another benefit to this public interest 
application in that it affords competition authorities to ‘…protect levels of employment 
through conditions…(as there is) a powerful link between direct employment loss and a 
restructuring initiative like a merger…’169. Only employment that is proved to be affected by 
the merger transaction will be considered in terms of this subsection, be it job losses or jobs 
saved
170
. 
 
In Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd/Transvaal Suiker Bpk
171
, it was averred by the merging 
parties that the merger would result in the creation of 3000 additional jobs as a direct result of 
the sale of portions of arable farm land that was at the time being used by TSB for the 
cultivation of sugar cane
172
. However as stated above
173
, it is unsure that this would not have 
occurred regardless of the transactions existence. Should the merger not have taken place 
then the additional result would be that the target firm would fail, as per the parties 
allegations, and there would arise an opportunity for its assets and operations to be procured 
by other interested parties. This could be either other firms, or new firms. Particularly in the 
areas where the target firms properties are situated, either another firm would purchase it and 
therefore employment opportunities would be created, or previously disadvantaged persons 
could enter the market through buying the property in addition to securing employment
174
.  
 
In Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd/Gold Fields Ltd
175
, there was a concern regarding the 
loss of jobs as a result of the merger with particular attention paid to the different 
consequences that arise from retrenchments to the class of the skilled labour force and the 
unskilled labour force. The Tribunal, upon a recommendation of the Commission that was 
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further revised, imposed a condition that the retrenchments would be limited to a certain 
amount. Furthermore, interestingly, the retrenchments were to be effected solely in 
managerial and supervisory categories. This is interesting as it is this group of employees that 
will be able to procure other employment positions with a greater ease than unskilled 
labour
176
. This order therefore had the effect of satisfying the need of the merged entity to 
reduce production costs by removing employee’s that generally earn higher salaries177 than 
unskilled labour and further forced the entity to streamline its operations as its business 
practice already is known to do
178
. The Tribunal stated that it is not interested in the decisions 
the acquiring firm makes in terms of running its business activities, but merely stated that 
should the firm make decisions to retrench, that it would be limited to the conditions imposed 
on the merger. Simultaneously, the needs of unskilled labour that would find it more difficult 
to secure other employment will be kept in their positions
179
. A further consideration is that 
the firm with a void in its managerial echelon would now have to increase the skill level of 
some of its lower echelon employees in order to fill this gap as it is unlikely that the firm 
would fire people already employed in these positions and thereafter hire others to fill 
them
180
. It is uncertain whether this occurred however the mere possibility of it indicates a 
further beneficial outcome to the transaction. In addition the affect that a merger has on 
employment is limited to exactly that, namely as a factual cause of the merger. The Tribunal 
is not concerned with job losses that occur in an industry that is following the general trend 
that exists, which is to say that this public interest criterion is not applicable to usual business 
trends in an industrial sector but is limited to considerations of effects related to a merger 
transaction
181
.  
 
The discussion regarding skilled and unskilled labour is a common one. In Tiger Brands 
Ltd/Langsberg Foods
182, where the Commission ‘…sought to impose a condition on the 
merger in respect of employment loss, the gist of which is that the merging parties should set 
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up a training fund that would not only benefit the retrenched workers but any other member 
of the Ashton Community.’183 
 
In Telkom SA Ltd/TPI Investments (Pty) Ltd
184
, a condition for the proposed merger was 
that employees would not be retrenched for a stated period
185
. Due to the nature of the 
telecommunications industry as discussed in the case, technological innovation is frequent 
and therefore there is the possibility that some employees will become redundant. Due to the 
fact that the effects of the merger sometimes materialises well after the conclusion of the 
contract, this condition provides a degree of job security to the employees of the merged 
entity whilst simultaneously possibly not being too great of an imposition on the merged 
entity itself. Further a condition was imposed stating that the obligation to not retrench any 
employees for the stated period discussed above, could be enforced individually by the 
employees themselves, which therefore gave employees the right to enforce this obligation
186
. 
Furthermore, a condition was imposed stating that as a result of the merger the new entity 
that was formed to merge with Telkom had no assets and therefore there was a concern that 
should the enterprise fail the employees would be left without any recourse to claim what 
may be due to them at such time. As a result the condition imposed to protect the interests of 
the employees further, was that the employment obligation was extended to bind the 
shareholder of the firm
187
. The time constraint that was imposed onto the merger also has the 
direct benefit to the employee that they will within that stated time be in a position to exploit 
the opportunity to receive more marketable skills from the merged entity.  
 
In Liberty Group Ltd/Capital Alliance Holdings Ltd
188
, there was a concern that the 
parties had not informed the employees of the possible worst case scenario in respect of 
retrenchments that could be a result of the merger. The Tribunal ordered the parties to consult 
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with the employees in order to afford them the right to raise any concerns they harboured 
regarding the merger. This is an indication that the competition authorities enforced the right 
to representation of employees that were clearly affected parties to the transaction and 
provided them a forum in which to raise their concerns in order for these matters to be 
considered before a decision was made on the outcome of the proposed merger.  
 
The failing firm rationale was invoked in Tiger Brands Ltd/Langberg Foods
189
, in an 
attempt to illustrate that ‘…Ashton will, sans merger, fail and that Langberg Food 
International would scale back its purchases.’190 It was proposed by the parties that should the 
merger not occur then the effect on employment would be severe, as compared to the job cuts 
that would occur should the merger be approved. However in order to use the failing firm 
rationale for the merger, the firms need ‘…to show that there is no more preferable buyer for 
the merging firm, (and) under the public interest they need to show that no one else would be 
willing to buy Ashton if it failed.’191 This could not be demonstrated by the parties’ 
evidence
192
. In addition,  both the aggressive negotiating tactics of Ashton during merger 
discussions and its consideration to buy LFI should the merger not be allowed indicated that 
the firm was not in a position of financial distress as represented. In fact it was found that as a 
result of failing to convince the Tribunal of the failing firm, it was then uncertain that any 
jobs would be lost should the merger not occur, but conversely jobs would be lost should it be 
approved
193
. In order to offset the harm to public interest, the Tribunal approved the merger 
subject to the condition that a sum of R2 Million would be invested to be used by the 
unskilled employees who lost their jobs as a result of the merger
194
. This figure as disputed 
by the merging parties as being too high and that it would prevent the emergence of the 
efficiencies that are expected to be a result of the merger. The Tribunal held that this was 
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incorrect as the potential elucidated by the parties of the merged firm would be able to handle 
the monetary investment that is the condition for approval. In Distiller’s195the merged 
company offered a reasonable package that was well beyond what the legislation regarding 
the matter dictates, as well as surpassed the previous practices of both of the merging 
firms
196
. This offer was further accepted practically unanimously. This situation is contrasted 
with that in Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd
197
, where it was stated that should the target 
firm not be allowed to merge with the acquiring firm that it would have to scale back some of 
its operations which would then result in many more jobs lost as compared to the small 
amount of managerial jobs that would be lost as a result of the merger being approved.  
 
In Unilever/The Competition Commission of South Africa
198
, it was stated that the number 
of potential job losses that were foreseeable as a result of the merger were not to be construed 
as substantial as there is the possibility that conditions could be imposed to offset the effects 
of these job losses
199
. Furthermore the tribunal held that the information regarding job losses 
was not to be understood as per the allegations of the merging parties that it is information of 
the privileged kind, which therefore means that employees not party to unions had no right to 
access such information
200
. The right to this information is more procedural than anything 
else, as employees whose status as such will be affected by a transaction are afforded a right 
to make representations in terms of this effect they are exposed to. The timing that such 
information is divulged is of supreme importance. This is regarding the fact that merger 
analysis is done prospectively. It will then be moot to divulge information after a decision on 
the matter has been already made. Regardless, it was stated categorically that ‘…the most 
powerful channel available to the unions to address employment related issues arising from 
the merger is the Labour Relations Act or private collective bargaining agreements where 
they exist.’201 The problem that befalls competition enquiries into public interest is that there 
are requirements to balance interests from both sides. In terms of Labour laws, there exist no 
such requirement which then avails a better suited and more beneficial forum for employees 
and unions to address their concerns
202
.  
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In Wal-Mart/Massmart
203
 merger, one of the conditions that were imposed was that the 
entity not be allowed to retrench people for a period of 3 years after the completion of the 
transaction
204
. This is good because it allows the employees to gain skills from this 
international retail giant. Further there was the concern that Wal-Mart has a reputation for de-
unionising the workforce. This is not something that needs to be worried about in a public 
interest analysis during a merger evaluation as there are other legislations with enough teeth 
that are there and able to deal with this matter better than the competition authorities. 
 
(c) The ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons, to become competitive: 
This criteria of the public interest tests that form part of the merger analysis as well as a 
general goal of competition law as listed in section 2 of the Act, I believe, is an attempt to 
rectify the injustices of the past through the use of income distribution economics. 
Preferential treatment has been afforded to previously disadvantaged persons that own or 
control firms, which is in line with the Black Economic Empowerment provisions that filter 
through various legislations.  
 
South Africa was in the unique position during Apartheid in that international investment 
and import-export abilities were hindered as a result of many States imposing sanctions and 
embargoes on the country. The profits that firms were then making were then invested locally 
and across different industries. The repercussions of this were that the minority had a very 
strong hold on varying sectors of the economy which then made barriers to entry even higher. 
‘In Anglo American Holdings Ltd/Kumba Resources Ltd205, it was suggested that this 
provision be interpreted widely in the light of the preamble and section 2. The apartheid 
economic system led to excessive concentrations in the economy, and it was one of the goals 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
was allowed. The cost of production regarding employment was alleged to be 60% of the overall costs incurred, 
and that through the merger in order to realize efficiency goals of the firm not more than 400 employees would 
be retrenched. In addition to this a quarter of the retrenched employees would be ear marked for re-employment 
should positions become available within the entire Lonmin Group. As a result of the target firm being in dire 
financial straits, the tribunal ordered that the firm instead of providing a financial investment into the area as has 
been seen to be the common remedy, that skills training would be afforded to retrenched employees for a period 
of 6 months post merger. This I believe to be a remedy that accommodates both the needs of the merged entity 
as well as those of the affected employees in a manner that is cost effective and not unduly unfair on either 
party.  
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of the Act to promote a wider spread of ownership of economic assets by a greater number of 
South Africans.’206 
 
What this translates into is that new firms, controlled or owned by previously 
disadvantaged persons found it difficult to enter into these markets. This was not only as a 
result of the barriers to entry, but further as a result of the poor standard of education and 
skills that they received, coupled with the pittance income they were paid. Therefore, by and 
large, there were no skills to use and no capital to invest in order to enter markets. There was 
therefore little chance for these entities to succeed having come from this background
207
.  
‘The Tribunal should refrain from unnecessarily restricting the business activities of firms 
that are controlled by black shareholders. It should not impose onerous conditions where 
empowerment firms dispose of assets for good business reasons.’208 However, the 
competition authorities are charged with the task of protecting the competitive process, and 
not certain competitors. S12A(3)(c) therefore poses a difficult scenario. This is an argument 
regarding the lessening of barriers to entry that exist in a market, and in terms of an efficiency 
argument I believe it should apply generally to all small and medium enterprises regardless of 
the race of the persons controlling or owning them. However, in reality, this cannot be the 
only method to introduce previously disadvantaged persons into the economy, and in fact it is 
not. According to the BEE Act
209
, enterprises are encouraged by law to reorganise their 
structure to be more representative of the population. This method of induction of this sector 
of the population seems to be a better option as firms which benefitted previously as a result 
of the laws that protected them are now incentivised to participate in a more equitable 
manner. Employees therefore are afforded skills training and are provided with opportunities 
to learn the industry they are in and become productive members of society. This is neither 
here nor there regarding public interest, as this is another –seemingly more suitable forum in 
which to address this matter. Specifically because competition law protects the competitive 
process, not competitors themselves- which is precisely what this section of the Acts public 
interest seems to promote.  
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In Schumann/Price’s Daelite210, it was evidenced that should the merger be prohibited 
then the resultant effect would be that there is a gaping hole left in the particular market. 
What would then happen is that the demand in the market for the product
211
 would- holding 
all other factors equal- remain the same, whilst supply would severely drop. This would then 
be a perfect opportunity for the small and medium firms that remain in the market to invest in 
increasing production capacity, and to innovate so as to frantically scramble to secure as 
much of the now shelved market share that was held by the failed firm. It would be simplest 
for the already existing firms in the market to earn the available market share as opposed to 
new firms entering the market and doing so. However the latter is also a possibility as a large 
firm has exited the market, which then reduces the barriers to entry into the market even 
more. Whatever occurs, the potential for many players to enter the market, selling 
homogenous goods, where prices are basically known between the producers due to the 
simplistic nature of the good
212
, these factors bode well for an argument in favor of a free 
market system as this market could possibly be considered quasi-perfect. It is interesting to 
note that without the regulation, that is, without the judicial system intervening in this merger 
and prohibiting it (regardless of the reason for such prohibition), the parties would have 
merged, and this quasi-perfect market would not have come into existence.  
In Business Venture Investments 790 (Pty) Ltd/Afrox Healthcare Limited
213
, it was 
averred by the parties granting loans to the acquiring Black Economic Empowered firm 
concerned, that the rationale for their participation in the merger was to secure this 
empowerment of a company owned/controlled by previously disadvantaged persons. The 
IDC
214
 ‘…is a state owned national development finance institution, mandated to promote, 
through its financial activities, economic growth, industrial development and economic 
empowerment.’215 In line with its mandate, it granted the fiscal assistance needed by the firm 
to effect the transaction and to aid in furthering the goals of the Act, which was in addition to 
the competition enquiry producing a positive result.  
                                                          
210
Supra note 170, para 75. 
211
Candles in this case. 
212
23/LM/May01 at par 77, where it was held that the poorest ranks of society consume these products, and 
consequently this is an indication that the products need to be cheaply made; in bulk due to their rapid 
expenditure; and without any need for much research and development for interested firms considering entering 
the market.  
213
105/LM/Dec04 at para 18 
214
Industrial Development Corporation 
215
Business Venture/Afrox Supra note 202,para 14. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
51 
 
In Engen Limited & Others/Sasol Oil & Other
216
, the fact that there were empowerment 
inclusions to the transaction, was not regarded in the public interest enquiry as their inclusion 
is not voluntary but prescribed by the petroleum industry charter
217
. Engen was already an 
empowered firm, and Sasol Oil was required by industry regulation to alter its constitution so 
as to comply with the empowerment charter that is in effect within the industry. Therefore 
regardless of the merger this would have to be complied with
218
. 
The sale of the land in Tongaat-Hulett/Transvaal Suiker
219
 to previously disadvantaged 
persons from the local community, seems to not have regarded that TSB’s agricultural 
operations are fully artificially irrigated. As opposed to the other competitors in the market 
that rely mainly on rain. This would then mean an increase in costs of production for the new 
cane growers, and so a lesser return on their production. Economically speaking this would 
decrease the amount of earning that would be made in the region, which would then decrease 
saving and investment. This would in turn decrease the buying ability to obtain capital goods 
and thereafter increase production, innovate, and evolve the industry. This therefore 
undercuts the potential that this act of corporate social responsibility could generate for the 
region, and renders this undertaking to be at risk of being viewed as a purely token gesture 
who’s supposed benefits cannot be realised. It is a token gesture because it will be difficult 
for these growers to become competitive. They have been given a small portion of the market 
and may well be regarded as subsistence farmers in the extreme. The Tribunal was of the 
opinion that the employment that would be created would have occurred in any case, and 
regardless of how it would occur, the benefits that would flow from it would not be sufficient 
to offset the anti-competitive effects that the transaction would produce.  
 
The merger in Shell/Tepco
220
 was approved unconditionally, and the conditions that 
were recommended by the Competition Commission were heavily criticised. In said 
criticism, it was interesting to note that the Competition Tribunal stated that ‘Empowerment 
is not furthered by obliging firms controlled by previously disadvantaged persons to continue 
to exist on a life support machine.’221 This shows the extent to which a public interest ground, 
in this case referring to s12A(3)(c), is to be considered and that more importantly in this 
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particular merger, where the firm owned by previously disadvantaged persons cannot 
withstand reasonable and usual competition within their relevant market coupled with the fact 
that should as a result of the merger the aforementioned firm be incorporated into another 
competitor firm, should competition in that market be unaffected therefore the public interest 
grounds are not sufficient to nullify the result of the competition segment of the enquiry. 
Namely that there is no substantial prevention or lessening of competition as a result of the 
transaction due to the fact that said firm has negligible participation in that market and 
equally as important, the fact that should the merger not have occurred then the result would 
be that the firm would foreclose in any event due to the internal shortcomings that it suffered 
from.  
I do not believe that this public interest factor should hold much weight although the 
rationale for its inclusion is favourable. There are other mechanisms to secure the 
participation of previously disadvantaged persons in the economy that I feel to be better 
suited to the realisation of such rationale. Through making existing firms more representative, 
previously disadvantaged people are available to exploit opportunities to gain knowledge in 
the field the pursue, whilst simultaneously not being exposed to the risks involved with 
entering markets with the possibility of lacking sufficient capital or knowledge to give 
themselves a chance to succeed. The chance for a firm to succeed is generally the same 
regardless of who controls it, however being a previously disadvantaged individual could in 
all probability further minimise the chances you have to succeed. The Broad Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act I feel sufficiently dealt with this conundrum of how to include 
and involve previously disadvantaged persons in the economy. Further the IDC’s mandate 
promotes such inclusion. This provision of the Act simply does not adhere to competition 
policy as a result of its segmentation of ownership of juristic persons being racially based to 
be capable of enjoying preferential treatment. I do not feel that competition law is the 
medium in which to effect such favourable treatment.   
(d) The ability of national industries to compete in international markets: 
In most cases it has been found that there is no correlation between mergers and abilities of 
the firms concerned to become more internationally competitive
222
. The matter regarding a 
firm’s ability to become internationally competitive depends largely on the comparative 
advantage of the industry and the firm as compared to those similar industries abroad.  
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 In Tongaat-Hulett/Transvaal Suiker
223
 the market is heavily regulated. ‘The South African 
sugar industry is a low cost producer, well set up to compete successfully on international 
markets.’224The Tribunal held that the trade tariffs imposed on imported goods ‘…insulated 
the South African market from foreign competition…’225, which seems to be a justifiable 
regulation of the market. This is because often with international competition, comes 
problems of products being dumped on the South African market at prices that cannot be 
matched by local producers. The effect of this is that international competition undercuts the 
domestic firm’s ability to compete in its market resulting, inevitably and in the extreme, in 
their exit from the market. Furthermore the parties alleged that the merger would benefit the 
competitiveness on the international market, however this argument failed due to the fact that 
the size of the merging firms were not inconsequential. ‘Cost competitiveness may be 
considerably influenced by the size of the productive units, however the merger has no direct 
influence on this there being no consolidation of any productive capacity.’226 
On the other hand, there is the problem that the new entity or the acquiring company is 
international and therefore will increase imports into the country. Such was the concern that 
existed in the Wal-Mart/Massmart merger that is currently under review from the 
Competition Appeal Court. This would then have the effect that the region within which the 
entity will operate is exposed to the risk that the demand for the local goods that they produce 
would decrease and therefore have negative roll on effects for the entire region. 
Further there needs to be an examination into the market share of Massmart, and the 
competitors that are within that same market. 
The public interest considerations cited above (in its enactment by the Legislature, as well 
as in its application by the Judiciary) are understood to be a regulation of the market by 
Organs of State. The purpose of the inclusion of public interest goals in legislation is 
“...deemed to be important to ensure longer-term balanced and sustainable growth.”227 
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CHAPTER FIVE– Legal Considerations      
There is the legal issue of the fact that it is the role of the electorate to make policy and law. 
However it is left to the Courts to preside on the matter that involves such considerations. 
This is seen to be an issue because the courts are then going to have to make decisions 
regarding policy considerations where they are in fact not the correct democratic forum in 
which to make the assertion, whilst simultaneously being the only practical forum in which 
these matters can be addressed. The solution to this is that the courts interpret these matters in 
a restrictive manner. ‘…it is incumbent on an un-elected, administrative tribunal, principally 
charged with defending and promoting competition, to approach its public interest mandate 
with great circumspection.’228 
 
An interesting consideration would be that as stated, a balance between regulated and 
free markets is to be obtained, and it is within the realm of the Legislature and the Executive 
to determine this balance. However in the restrictive interpretation by the Judiciary of the 
intention and policy of these two Organs of State, the resultant decision will be created 
through a process that actually favours a free market economy because the carefully 
considered balance is vitiated to a degree by this sort of interpretation being employed. One 
practical view of the restrictive interpretation of the Judiciary of this competition law policy 
is that in substance the courts favour a free market system.  
 
“The greater the number of objectives or constraints that a competition authority is 
required to take into consideration, the higher the likelihood that the focus of enforcement 
efforts will not centre primarily on safeguarding the competitive process.”229 The courts of a 
State are in no position to be price setters, and have a long history of preferring to not involve 
themselves with commercial decisions made between parties – especially where the parties 
both do not agree to what the court decides. Further, due to the fact that the parties before the 
                                                          
228
Daun et Cie/Kolosus Supra note 169, at para 124; Unilever/Robertson Foods Supra note 109; Shell/Tepco 
Supra note 21; and Distell/Stellenbosch Farmers Supra note 112. 
229
Hoekman and Holmes, op. cit. note 7, at 884. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
55 
 
court seldom are forthcoming with required information, the court is at a further disadvantage 
as they cannot make a decision based on all the relevant information
230
. 
Regarding mergers, their implications are conducted before the merger actually 
occurs, where the reality is that the effects of the merger can only be ascertained after the 
merger has been concluded (and is thus irrevocable and irreversible), the situation is always 
present regarding whether the correct decision was made. The underlying purpose of merger 
regulation is to prevent the proliferation of anti-competitive constructions that have no 
efficiency justifications for their existence. Sometimes the courts are not fully equipped to be 
making such determinations even if they have been granted the power to do this by the 
legislature. Without the required expertise there is a danger that a decision will be made with 
the intention of safeguarding and promoting competition however where the effects of the 
decision in question in reality negate this goal. “This is why merger regulation is so 
important- rather constrain through merger regulation, the rise of structures conducive to 
monopolistic conduct then imagine that they can be easily controlled after the fact.”231 
Merging parties desire their transaction to go through with as little delay and investigation as 
possible so that they could maximise their potential within that market. 
Additionally, matters of exclusionary conduct perpetrated by firms are difficult to 
bring to trial. Parties are generally not forthcoming with information because they do not 
want to expose their investment to the risk of losing any possible benefits that will flow from 
them as a result of their decision to be completely open with the information that they have 
and to what their intentions are. These hurdles are put in place by the parties for competition 
authorities to jump over, knowing full well the limited resources that these authorities have. 
“The competition authorities, however well intentioned, are well advised not to pursue their 
public interest mandate in an over-zealous manner lest they damage precisely those interests 
that they ostensibly seek to protect.”232 
There is an issue in merger considerations that the transaction attempts to go through 
with as little hindrance as possible. Regulations even though they exist for the purpose of 
protecting interests that will be affected by the transaction, at the same time bring negative 
ramifications as a result of this delay. I do not believe that the merging parties would avoid 
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considering a merger as a result of these ‘other’ regulations as a merger has its rationale cast 
in the furtherance of the firm’s profitability. The only negative effect that I see this regulation 
having is that it will take more time, as compared to the significant positive effects of 
increased transparency, increased protection to those members of society that require it - be it 
consumers or other smaller firms that could risk ejection from the market as a result of not 
being able to compete in that market post merger; or employees that will be affected by the 
merger detrimentally; or previously disadvantaged persons being prevented from expanding 
their economic interests and activities thus relegating them to remain disadvantaged. 
CHAPTER SIX– Practical Implications      
 ‘We derive some comfort from the knowledge that each of the elements of public interest 
that we are obliged to consider are protected and promoted by legislation and institutions 
specifically designed for that purpose…’233 
 
In terms of the requirement to empower historically disadvantaged people in South 
Africa, there are other regulations besides for the Act that require compliance in order to 
achieve this goal
234
. Focusing on the Act however, there are cases that exist that have dealt 
with this. ‘The role played by the competition authorities in defending even those aspects of 
the public interest listed in the Act is, at most, secondary to other statutory and regulatory 
instruments – in this case the Employment Equity Act, the Skills Development Act, and the 
(Empowerment) Charter itself spring to mind.’235 This then shows what is confirmed by case 
law, that public interest is not a main or even an equal priority in competition law, as 
compared to efficiency. This however does not negate the fact that it is still to be considered. 
However the ramifications of the consideration are in practice blunted compared to the 
ordinary understanding of what was written in the Act. 
 
 In terms of the consideration of competition authorities of the public interest criteria 
listed in s12A(3)(a) of the Act, it is said that ‘…a competition authority should be 
conservative in addressing this aspect of public interest issue (and that) it is preferable for 
these problems to be regulated by other authorities.’236 I do not believe this to be correct, as it 
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is the competition authority and the Tribunal which are the refereeing entities with the closest 
link between government and market regulation. These entities are able to access information 
and advice from varying professional fields, and further the Minister is afforded a right to 
appear at hearings so as to aid the court in its determination of the matter. The Tribunal and 
the Competition Appeal Court are not ordinary courts, they are specialized and presided over 
by officers who hold sufficient knowledge in these matters so as to tread satisfactorily in 
these waters. There is of course the probability that these presiding officers lack the degree of 
expertise required in a given matter, and could rule on matters with the intention of adhering 
to the law in a manner intended to inflict the minimal amount of harm onto society – which is 
the courts mandate, that is, to in fact protect society and its interests. In terms of mergers, this 
dilemma would be solved through a decrease in relevant information asymmetry, and this is 
left for the parties to comply. 
In Shell/Tepco
237
 it was stated that ‘This case raises very important considerations in 
the interpretation of the public interest in the context of a merger assessment. While public 
interest concerns are explicitly incorporated into the merger assessment process, it is 
recognised that they should be interpreted very cautiously, and that the role of other policy 
initiatives in promoting those public interest objectives may be far more important than that 
of competition law.’238 
It was reiterated that the importance of the public interest test in a merger analysis 
‘...may lead to the prohibition of (or the imposition of conditions on) a pro-competitive 
merger. Or it may result in us approving an anti-competitive merger. Hence in balancing the 
public interest and competition we are obliged to consider whether a merger that passes 
muster on the competition evaluation nevertheless falls to be prohibited because of its 
negative impact on any of the specified public interest factors...’239 
As noted in this case there is no guidance in the Act about how exactly to consider 
public interest, with the only qualification to said consideration being that it should be 
‘substantial’.240 
The Tribunal further held in this case that it is reluctant to involve itself in 
commercial decision of firms, especially since doing so could lead the Judiciary as an Organ 
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of State to meddle in the business of private firms. The Tribunal expressed that it has no 
desire to assume such a role.
241
 
Regarding the need for public interest to be included in competition legislation, and 
the use thereof, the Competition Commission stated that “...as a public authority it must be 
guided by the public interest, it must enforce public policy.”242 The Tribunal responded to 
this stating that where the Commission uses public interest as a basis for its intervention, that 
such intervention needs to be cautiously pursued. It was reiterated
243
 that the public interest 
goals are secondary to the other Legislations that specifically exist to deal with related 
matters
244
, and that the pursuit of the public interest criteria’s should be conducted wearily 
“...least that damage precisely those interests that they ostensibly seek to protect.”245 
In Mittal Steel/ Harmony Gold Mining
246
 , it was stated that ‘The Tribunal does not 
function as an ordinary court. Competition proceedings involve the public interest, and under 
the Act, the Tribunal has an active role to play in protecting that interest. “As a result, the 
Tribunal conducts its proceedings in an inquisitorial manner, potentially calling its own 
witnesses, accepting evidence not normally admissible in a court of law, allowing a broad 
range of participants, and adjusting its procedures as it sees fit.”247’ Further this case 
highlighted the consideration of public interest to be secondary to the competition 
consideration
248
. South African competition law does not really focus on the protection of 
public interest and even though the courts are empowered to promote or refute a merger 
based on public interest considerations, in practice it has not yet happened
249
. 
In Freeworld Coatings Limited / Competition Commission & Kansai Paint Company 
Limited
250
 there were very stringent conditions imposed on the merger as a result of the anti-
competitive effects it produced, as well as the effects it had on public interest grounds
251
. The 
public interest effect that it had was that Freeworld Coatings was a local firm with exemplary 
BEE criteria. The fact that it would be taken over by a foreign entity, Kansai Paint Company 
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Limited, was feared to have a detrimental effect on the ‘... “keep it local” nature of 
Freeworld’s operations, describing it as contributing to a uniquely South African product 
development and commercialisation...’252, and in an attempt to mitigate these effects the 
Competition Commission approved the merger subject to conditions that would serve the 
public interest, namely: 
‘The Commission further added several conditions which it believes will serve the public 
interest: 
  No retrenchments for a period of three years following the merger 
 Kansai will continue to manufacture decorative coatings for a period of ten years, and 
is required to establish an automotive coatings manufacturing facility in South Africa 
within five years 
 Kansai will invest in South African research and development in decorative coatings 
 Kansai will implement a BEE transaction within two years’253 
 
The inclusion of the public interest relating to employment in this manner is not a novel 
method of addressing the public interest requirement
254
, as the Tribunal believes that there are 
better and specialised institutions that are able to adequately address matters dealing with 
employment. On the matter of employment, there have been explicit provisions made 
regarding the inclusion of procedural rights afforded to employees and their trade union 
representatives
255
. In Mittal Steel/Harmony Gold Mining
256
 there was the further contention 
that the employees that were not in executive/manager positions and who were ordinary 
labourers were to be protected more than their higher ranking colleagues because their 
prospect for employment should they lose their jobs as a result of the merger would impose a 
greater burden onto them.   
  
In the party’s submissions in the case of Wal-Mart/Massmart257, it was not so much a 
consideration in the merger analysis of the efficiencies that the merger would or would not 
bring. There was empirical proof of the fact that Wal-Mart actually does benefit the consumer 
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and therefore consumer welfare in the sense that its main selling point is that it sells products 
at reduced prices
258
 and increased consumer choices
259
.   
 
However what the contention was regarding public interest in this matter was that Wal-
Mart has a reputation of increasing imports into the country it enters. This would have the 
effect of decreasing the demand on local producers which would in turn threaten goals of 
growth in those domestic sectors
260
. However it was contended that the procurement of goods 
locally by Massmart was not as a result of its inability to procure goods internationally and 
enjoy the same benefits Wal-Mart does, due to Wal-Mart’s massive contacts in the global 
supply chain
261
. The merger was conditionally approved, with conditions similar to those of 
the Kansai case. The decision was taken on appeal to the CAC and is currently pending.  
 
The fear that economists have regarding matters being decided on in terms of public 
interest considerations is that, as in the Wal-Mart-Massmart merger, foreign investors will be 
dissuaded from investing in South Africa as they may be of the opinion that the conditions 
relating to their business that may be imposed on them are too stringent, and as a 
consequence they will invest elsewhere
262
.  
 
In terms of recorded opinions of major practitioners of competition law in South 
Africa
263
, the negative effects of time delays in the implementation of decisions by firms that 
occurs when public interests are considered, where necessary, are negligible. This is because 
as these public interest have been included in the Act it forces them to be considered by all 
the parties. This I suppose could be regarded as the market regulating itself as it considers 
these matters beforehand so as to limit any potential delays to the process in question. Such 
action would be beneficial for all parties involved as the parties would decrease the time that 
is spent on the matter being scrutinized, and the competition authorities would not have to 
waste more time and money, of which both are in short supply, considering matters that it 
could get assistance in considering. However the reality is that should these interests not have 
been included, then they would not be regarded at all, and economic policies would be mere 
statements with even more limitations on their ability to be applied than presently exists.  
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CONCLUSION          
‘…government plays a substantial role in the economy. It not only provides the rules for 
economic activity but also promotes economic stability and growth, provides certain goods 
and services that would otherwise be under produced or not produced at all, and modifies the 
distribution of income. The government is however not the dominant economic force in 
deciding what to produce, how to produce it, and who will get it. That force is the market.’264 
 ‘…competition authorities are unlikely to prohibit a merger that is not anti-
competitive, or approve a merger that is anti-competitive, on public interest grounds…The 
most important effect of the public interest criteria has been that the authorities frequently 
approve mergers subject to conditions that protect the public interest.’265 This is evidenced in 
Glaxo Wellcome pls/Smithklin Beecham plc
266
 where it was proposed to the Tribunal that 
‘…the merged firm allow competition by producers of generic drugs, hich could be used to 
treat opportunistic infections in HIV/AIDS cases and anti-retrovirals for HIV.’267 However 
the tribunal could not justify the condition based on any of the public interest grounds in the 
Act. 
  ‘From an economic perspective, (competition) policy should aim at safeguarding the 
competitive process so that firms are able to compete away any excess profits that may exist 
at any point.’268, and further, that ‘...many specialists have recommended that developing 
countries pursue a broad based competition policy... (using) the key principle underlying an 
active competition policy stance is to rely on market forces to determine the allocation of 
productive resources, subject to the constraint of ensuring social equity objectives are realised 
as efficiently as possible, and that mechanisms exist through which attempts to create 
monopolies and exploitation of market power can be addressed.’269 Therefore there should be 
a hybrid of regulation and reliance on market forces to attain a fragile balance needed to 
allow a market to work in a desirable manner, addressing all required goals.  
There is definitely a need for public interest in competition legislation. This is because 
it is this legislation that deals with economic matters that are required to be regarded in 
specific instances. For example due to the forward looking nature of merger analysis, it can 
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be economically predicted what the possible effects the transaction would have on s12A(3) 
listed factors. This is the only legislation that allows such scrutiny over commercial decision 
prior to the transaction being recognised and therefore legally available to be implemented. It 
is true that there are other regulatory bodies that exist in South Africa, and abroad as well, 
that deal with the specific matters enshrined in this article. However they are only able to be 
mobilised once a breach of their provisions has occurred.  
The forward looking ascertainment of the effects of the transaction is thus very useful, 
in an attempt to prevent possible and reasonably foreseeable harm from occurring, before it 
occurs.  
Regarding the effects that the transaction would have on trade and industry, this 
public policy consideration is important for the ascertainment of how the conduct will affect 
government’s economic goals of encouraging and nourishing national economic growth, 
efficiency and social welfare. The same rationale is true for the heightened protection of 
firms owned by previously disadvantaged persons being encouraged to participate in the 
economy and compete in the markets. I view this provision as being something akin to a 
handicap policy in golf, where firms that are exposed to higher risk of failure in their ability 
to participate in the market due to their historical economic disabilities, as it were, should be 
given a proportionate ‘helping hand’ to be able to participate fairly. However regarding 
section 2(e) and 12A(3)(c) respectively, the public interest is in conflict with competition 
policy itself. There are better means in which to secure the attainment of this goal, namely 
through the provisions of the BEE Act as it relates to concessions and charters formulated by 
the Executive to encourage/force the industries to which these acts relate to become 
representative.   
The same rationale applies for domestic industries that are to be protected from 
international firms perverting said industries, thereby having the possible consequence of 
retarding national economic growth and the fulfilment of the other economic goals of 
efficiency (in the domestic and global consideration) and of domestic social welfare.  
The reasons that public interest considerations exist is to account for the effect that 
decisions of players within the market have on the market itself and on intricately linked 
economic considerations of growth, efficiency and welfare. 
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The contentions that public interest considerations specifically hinder market 
functionality in terms of the delays that are involved with the consideration of these criteria, 
are ill founded as should the parties be prepared to disclose all relevant information prior to 
the hearing then the investigations regarding these criteria would be swifter, and consume 
less resources – both from the parties themselves that will be faced with extended periods in 
court and therefore the associated legal fees, as well as for the competition authorities that 
will not need to expend as much capital and time resources into the necessary investigation of 
the matter. 
 
 With regard to the matter of income and wealth distribution, ‘the market system is 
impersonal and may distribute income more inequitably than society desires. It yields very 
large incomes to those whose labour, by virtues of inherent ability and acquired education 
and skills, command high wages.’270 This is then a basis to repute the free market system as it 
does not take sufficient cognisance of the fact that in developing countries, there is a need to 
promote equity values especially where there has been a historical discrimination which is 
presently required to be rectified. It seems that the inclusion of equity issues in economic 
growth policy will hamper the speed at which desired growth rates will be realised. However 
according to Kuznets inverted U hypothesis, referring specifically to the fact that should pure 
efficiency be the only policy objective in realising economic growth, the advantaged will 
become more advantaged for a time and the disadvantaged will become more so. This time 
frame is not a matter of months or a few years, as economic growth is popularly discussed in 
terms of changes evident from generation to generation. This amelioration of wealth and 
income disparity will be seen in economic terms through a reduction in the gap between the 
Lorentz curve and the 45 degree line. Should this pure efficiency goal be followed, the result 
will be undue civil unrest. Historically disadvantaged people vote for representation with the 
hope that past injustices will be remedied and results will be evident within reasonable time. 
To expect the majority of South African citizens to suffer further post Apartheid, with 
representation of their own democratic choosing, is simply ludicrous and will never be 
accepted.   
I believe therefore that public interest does indeed have a place in competition policy, 
as it is a form of necessary regulation of the market so as to guide growth and development in 
a manner that promotes social welfare and equity. The process may take longer however the 
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results will gradually begin to be seen in each income bracket thus abating the frustrations of 
previously disadvantaged persons and further promoting a uniform equitable economic 
growth. 
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